European governments say they are preparing for a serious threat from Russia. A newly released wargame suggests they may be preparing too late, and that a fast, limited Russian move could expose how slow and divided Europe and NATO can be when the situation is messy and politically confusing.

The scary part is not that Russia steamrolls Europe in a huge conventional war. The scary part is that Russia might not need to. A smaller incursion, wrapped in a so called humanitarian excuse, could be enough to create panic, hesitation, and a credibility crisis for NATO before the alliance even agrees on what to do.

A Wargame Built Around A Weak Link

The exercise that triggered this debate simulated a Russian incursion into Lithuania. It was organized in December by Germany’s Die Welt newspaper together with the German Wargaming Center of the Helmut Schmidt University of the German Armed Forces. Sixteen former senior German and NATO officials, lawmakers, and security experts role played the scenario, set in October 2026.

In the scenario, Russia used the pretext of a humanitarian crisis in Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave wedged near Lithuania and Poland. Under that cover, Russia seized the Lithuanian city of Marijampole, a strategic crossroads in the narrow gap between Russia and Belarus.

Marijampole matters because it sits near one of the most important highway intersections in the region. One direction connects to Poland through the Via Baltica route that ties Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the rest of NATO by land. Another route is a transit road Lithuania must keep open for traffic between Belarus and Kaliningrad.

What The Wargame Showed

In the wargame, Russia achieved a shocking result quickly, using an initial force of about 15,000 troops. Within a couple of days, it destroyed NATO’s credibility in the Baltic region and established domination, largely because the alliance failed to respond decisively.

Several details made the result feel plausible and unsettling:

• The United States declined to invoke NATO’s Article 5, partly because Russia framed the operation as humanitarian rather than an outright invasion.
• Germany hesitated, and that hesitation shaped everything else.
• Poland mobilized but did not send troops across the border into Lithuania.
• A German brigade already deployed to Lithuania failed to intervene, in part because Russia used drones to lay mines on roads leading out of its base.

A military analyst who played Russia’s top general staff role argued the most important factor was not equipment, but belief. Deterrence depends on what the enemy believes about your will, and in the wargame the players portraying Russia assumed Germany would hesitate, and that assumption was enough.

A Polish security analyst playing the Polish prime minister said the exercise revealed a psychological pattern: when confronted with Russia’s escalatory story, Western leaders often default to thinking they should be the ones de escalating.

Some Say The Wargame Was Not Realistic

Not everyone accepts the exercise as a true forecast. Lithuanian military leadership pushed back hard.

Lithuania’s chief of defense staff said that in real life, Lithuania and allies would likely have enough intelligence warning to avoid the surprise. He also argued Lithuania’s own forces could handle a limited threat to Marijampole. Lithuania has about 17,000 troops in peacetime and can mobilize to 58,000 quickly.

He also added a deterrence argument of his own: if Russia starts something, NATO should make clear that Russia would lose Kaliningrad. In other words, Russia would face extremely high stakes if it tried to turn a limited move into a lasting position.

The commander of German land forces said NATO intelligence still assesses Russia would not be able to act against alliance members until 2029, and insisted Germany and allies are ready to fight tonight. But what if they are not? Poll: 60% of Germans Would Not Fight if Invaded – A Symptom of Societal Decay?

There is also a broader skeptic view about Russia’s capacity. Finland’s president said Putin has failed in virtually everything he set out to do and is not succeeding in Ukraine, so Europe should not overestimate Russian capacity (ACZ Experts believe Putin got everything he wanted, and is in exactly the spot he wants to be in).

Lithuanian defense leadership also noted the numbers Russia is burning through in Ukraine: Russia recruits about 35,000 fresh troops a month but loses about 30,000 per month on the battlefield. That churn limits how fast Russia can build up new forces.

Something Sooner Than 2029?

The earlier view in Berlin and other capitals was that Russia would not be able to threaten NATO until 2029 or so. What changed is a growing belief that Russia is retooling for something bigger than Ukraine, and that Europe may not have enough time to finish its own defense rebuild.

The Dutch defense minister said his assessment is that Russia will be able to move large amounts of troops within one year. He said Russia is increasing strategic inventories and expanding its presence and assets along NATO borders.

On top of that, some European officials and analysts argue Russia could free up a massive number of troops quickly even without peace. They say Russia could shift from offensive operations to holding the line in Ukraine and instantly free up as many as 200,000 battle hardened troops, more than Putin used for the initial full scale invasion in 2022.

That idea leads to a blunt question a former senior German defense official asked through the wargame logic: if Putin’s goal is to show that NATO’s Article 5 does not work and to split Europeans, why wait until Europeans are more ready?

The Indications Russia Is Postured For More Than Ukraine

Several warning signs were cited across the materials you provided:

• Russia has moved to a war economy, focusing national resources on rearmament and military recruitment beyond what the Ukraine campaign alone requires.
• Russia’s arms industry has been running production lines at breakneck speed, 24 hours a day, supported by billions in stimulus.
• Russia has used large signing bonuses to recruit, at times bringing in more than a thousand recruits per day.
• Russian officials insist they have no designs on NATO or EU territory, but Russia also insisted years ago it had no intention to invade Ukraine.

The fear is that if the Ukraine front stabilizes or a deal freezes the war, Russia’s war machine might be redirected rather than shut down.

Where Russia Might Strike If It Wants A Fast Political Win

NATO military planners worry about Russian designs on multiple points that are politically explosive and geographically sensitive:

• The Baltic nations, especially Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which were once part of the Russian Empire and are now in both the EU and NATO.
• Swedish, Finnish, and Danish islands in the Baltic Sea.
• Parts of Poland.
• The Norwegian and Finnish far north.
• Strikes on strategic infrastructure as far west as the Dutch port of Rotterdam.

There is also a strong focus on the gray zone. European officials warn Russia can push tactics that are intentionally calibrated below the threshold that triggers a clean NATO response. That forces 31 other allies to debate whether Article 5 has been crossed, which is exactly the indecision Russia would want.

One way leaders describe Putin’s motivation is a desire to resurrect imperial glory, making former imperial territories obvious targets. That does not require Putin to conquer all of Europe. It can mean testing NATO in places with Russian history, Russian speaking populations, or geographic chokepoints, then daring Europe to respond.

In that framing, the goal is not only territory. It is also proof. Proof that NATO will hesitate, proof that Europe is divided, and proof that the American security guarantee is no longer automatic.

Europe’s Weaknesses Are Not Just About Money

The Friends of Europe analysis argues Europe’s vulnerability is structural and cultural, built over decades:

• Decades of underspending and dependence on external security guarantors.
• Fragmentation across 27 defense markets that do not produce a coherent whole.
• Dozens of incompatible systems across tanks, fighters, artillery, and command structures that are expensive and slow to maintain.
• Heavy dependence on foreign suppliers, importing roughly three quarters of major weapon systems and relying on external sources for critical materials.
• Slow decision making, political risk aversion, and a legalistic peacetime mindset that struggles to respond to hybrid warfare.

Their argument is that money alone will not fix it. Europe has to spend better, standardize, procure jointly, consolidate industry, and adopt a whole of society approach to resilience and civil preparedness.

Trump: The EU Leaders Are Weak

Trump criticized European leaders as weak and described European countries as decaying. He suggested the U.S. could scale back support for Ukraine and dismissed European diplomacy by saying they talk but do not produce.

European officials pushed back by arguing Europe is showing strength through increased defense investment and continued support for Ukraine.

But the political point remains: if Europe’s security depends on unity, and unity depends on confidence in U.S. backing, then public doubts about American commitment become a strategic vulnerability Russia can exploit.

Skeptics Versus Alarmists On Russia’s Capacity

Two views clash directly:

The skeptic view

• Russia is bogged down in Ukraine and paying enormous costs in men and equipment.
• Russia’s monthly recruiting is being matched by monthly losses.
• Putin has not tried NATO because he is not succeeding in Ukraine.

The alarmist view

• Russia does not need a huge army to cause a NATO crisis.
• Putin has exactly what he wants in Ukraine.
• Russia could act early, seize advantageous positions, and then defend them.
• Hybrid tactics and humanitarian pretexts can delay or split allied decision making.
• If a Ukraine deal or frozen conflict happens, Russia could accelerate the war machine even more.

Even critics of the wargame do not claim Europe is in a strong position. They claim the specific scenario might be beatable. That is not the same as saying Europe is ready.

Europe is only now ramping up after many years of low spending and heavy reliance on the U.S. NATO leaders have pledged a long path toward much higher spending, but the analysis warns that money cannot buy time, readiness, or deterrence on demand.

The wargame’s core message is simple and unsettling: a fast Russian move, paired with a gray zone narrative, could force Europe to make the hardest decision in its security system. Not after months of debate, but in days. And right now, Europe still looks like it is trying to relearn how to move quickly, together, and without waiting for Washington to tell it what to do.

ACZ Editor: We already know that China will support Russia if it serves China’s needs. While we are not willing to accept that an attack is imminent, it is scary to suppose that attacks on the EU and Taiwan could happen simultaneously coordinated to wait until the U.S. was committed to the European theater then launching on Taiwan. The EU would certainly need our help in repelling Russian, and America would most likely end up as Taiwan’s only ally.

The problem is that, in general, rich people don’t fight. The richer countries of the EU will have a tough time and Taiwan will have a tough time each for the same reason, they are not used to fighting and will weigh the options as if giving up and serving under a totalitarian dictatorship is something they may be willing to tolerate.