Inside the Chinese Communist Party’s top leadership, the once unshakable authority of Xi Jinping appears to be crumbling. Analysts observing the Fourth Plenum in Beijing say the meeting exposed deep fractures within the Party and military, revealing that Xi’s control – long regarded as absolute – is now slipping. The signs are subtle but unmistakable: key allies have been purged, military leaders once loyal to him are being sidelined, and even Party statements now emphasize collective leadership instead of personal devotion.

Fading Control Inside the Party

Xi emerged from the closed-door meeting retaining his three major titles – Party General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission – but not the aura of total dominance that once surrounded him. The ouster of nine senior generals, including some of Xi’s oldest allies, shocked Party insiders. Many of these men had risen through the 31st Group Army in Fujian Province, where Xi spent 17 years during his early political career. That group, known informally as Xi’s “family army,” had been considered the bedrock of his power inside the People’s Liberation Army.

Political commentator Jason Ma said the purge made little sense as a move initiated by Xi himself. “It makes no sense for Xi Jinping, who has only the support of his own faction, to begin removing members of that faction,” Ma said during his current affairs program on NTD. He noted that among the fallen was Admiral Miao Hua, one of Xi’s most trusted subordinates whose long history with Xi in Fujian was believed to have secured his rise. “No leader can exercise authority without people who answer their personal command, and Miao was just such an old subordinate to carry out Xi’s orders in the military,” Ma added.

The scale of the disruption was equally remarkable. Nearly one-sixth of the Central Committee members failed to appear at the meeting, a record level of absenteeism not seen in half a century. Some were expelled, others had died, but dozens were simply missing, raising questions about arrests or internal detentions. As Ma put it, “What’s unfolding is the hollowing out of Xi’s power. His trusted aides are on the losing end, and he is no longer in a position to intervene.”

The Rise of General Zhang Youxia

One figure has emerged from the turmoil with growing authority: General Zhang Youxia, the top-ranking vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Once a close confidant of Xi – both men are sons of revolutionary commanders who fought together during the Chinese civil war – Zhang now appears to have become Xi’s most formidable rival.

Insiders told The Epoch Times that Zhang has openly disagreed with Xi on major military strategy, particularly over the question of invading Taiwan. In internal meetings, Zhang reportedly warned that such a move could trigger direct involvement by the United States and its allies, plunging China into a costly conflict it could not afford. “Zhang holds a different view,” one insider explained. “He has objected to mounting a Taiwan invasion, warning that it would risk chaos and destroy China’s economy.”

Xi, according to these sources, saw Zhang’s dissent as undermining military morale and responded by ordering an investigation into the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department—both under Zhang’s influence. But Zhang struck back through personnel changes and probes targeting Xi loyalists, including Admiral Miao Hua and General He Weidong, the latter one of the nine generals recently dismissed. He had been instrumental in organizing military drills around Taiwan following former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in 2022, but by 2025 he too was gone.

The eventual promotion of Zhang Shengmin as a compromise vice chairman of the Central Military Commission reflected the uneasy balance of power. A senior official described Zhang Shengmin as a “centrist” who could appease both camps. Analysts say this compromise indicates that Xi could no longer dictate military appointments on his own terms.

Zhang’s rising prominence was clear during the September 2025 military parade in Tiananmen Square. He was seen standing alongside retired Party elders – an honor that by protocol should have been beyond his rank. The parade’s master of ceremonies was not a senior general but a junior officer, Han Shengyan, known to be Zhang’s aide. The departure from strict ceremonial norms signaled, in the eyes of multiple observers, that Zhang’s influence had eclipsed expectations.

Tug of War Between Xi and the Generals

Xi retains command of the propaganda machine and the security apparatus, but his hold over the military has loosened. One military source described the situation as “a tug of war” between two centers of power. The source said the ongoing purges had strengthened Zhang’s military position but left Xi with fewer allies to rely on.

The United States has taken note of the instability. When China recently expanded export controls on rare-earth materials, President Donald Trump wrote on TruthSocial, “Don’t worry about China, it will all be fine!” Trump suggested that Xi had “just had a bad moment.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent later told reporters that the move likely reflected internal dissent, with “hardliners trying to undermine the relationship” rather than a unified strategy from Xi himself.

Analyst Shen Ming-Shih, from Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told The Epoch Times that the rare-earth restrictions were “about a power struggle, a political calculation.” He believes Xi may be creating crises to weaken rivals and reassert dominance, while dovish factions such as Zhang’s seek stability. Yeh Yao-yuan, chair of international studies at the University of St. Thomas, added that the official position of unity is merely cosmetic. “The Party officially speaks with one voice and will not acknowledge any split,” Yeh said.

The Party Reasserts Control

The language of the Fourth Plenum’s final communiqué confirmed the shift. For the first time in years, references to “Xi Jinping Thought” were omitted, and the familiar loyalty slogans appeared only once. Analysts interpreted the subdued tone as evidence that the Party was reasserting institutional control. “His base hasn’t collapsed, but the evaluation was muted,” political analyst Wang Jian observed.

Wang noted that the communiqué focused heavily on self-reliance and national security instead of ideology. It used the term “struggle” four times—a reminder of the Party’s internal battles—and emphasized technological self-sufficiency and domestic strength. Sun Kuo-hsiang, a researcher at Taiwan’s Nanhua University, said the document showed China preparing for “a long-term standoff with the United States.”

In the same spirit, China’s state-run press praised the meeting for launching “a new chapter of the China miracle.” Yet the optimism rang hollow. As China analyst Wang He explained, “Behind closed doors, they stab each other, but in public, they still clink glasses.”

Cracks in the Facade of Power

Outside observers have been noting Xi’s growing isolation for months. His decision to skip the 2025 BRICS Summit in Brazil was unprecedented. For years, Xi had used the gathering to project global leadership, and his absence was interpreted as a signal of internal constraint. His wife, Peng Liyuan, has also not been seen publicly for over two months, while key ally Ma Xingrui was quietly reassigned from his powerful post in Xinjiang.

Former U.S. diplomat Gregory Slayton called these signs “clear evidence that Xi’s control is crumbling.” Writing in July, Slayton argued that “dictators frequently appear unbreakable until they break,” comparing Xi’s predicament to the last years of the Soviet Union. He urged President Trump to maintain economic and diplomatic pressure, saying that the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration had “helped push the Chinese economy into truly dire straits, weakening Xi while upping the odds that his replacement will be more favorable toward U.S. interests.”

Slayton argued that Xi’s economic failures, rising unemployment, and staggering debt have alienated both the public and the elite. “If a critical mass of CCP leaders believes their nation cannot afford any more upheaval, they may well be orchestrating a smooth exit for Xi to avoid a messy coup,” he said.

Inside China, the Party continues to project calm, holding study sessions and broadcasting tributes to Xi’s leadership. But the tone of these sessions has grown ritualistic and hollow. Many within the system, analysts say, now view Xi as a liability rather than an asset. “They are grasshoppers tied to the same string,” said one Chinese activist quoted by The Epoch Times, using a local idiom meaning that all Party leaders are trapped in the same fate.

For now, Xi remains the face of the regime, but the balance of power appears to be shifting back toward collective leadership. The rise of Zhang Youxia, the quiet sidelining of Xi’s inner circle, and the muted language of official documents all point to a transformation unfolding behind closed doors.

Xi once styled himself the “Chairman of Everything.” Today, he looks increasingly like a chairman surrounded by uncertainty—one whose enemies are no longer outside the Party but sitting across the same table. As the struggle within the Chinese leadership deepens, the world watches to see whether Xi can reassert his power or whether China’s leaders have already begun to prepare for life after him.

ACZ Editor: We have covered stories of this kind before, the political machinations of China are difficult to read.