For more than two centuries, the Monroe Doctrine has served as one of the defining principles of American foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. First announced in 1823, it warned European powers that further attempts to colonize or interfere in the Americas would be viewed as hostile to the United States. While its application has evolved over time, the underlying objective has remained remarkably consistent: preventing outside powers from establishing dominant influence close to America’s borders.

Today, supporters of President Donald Trump argue that the doctrine is taking on a modern form. Rather than confronting European empires, the challenge now comes from Communist China, whose influence has expanded across Latin America through infrastructure investments, strategic ports, mining concessions, subsidized exports, debt financing, and diplomatic pressure. Supporters believe a renewed American focus on the Western Hemisphere could gradually reduce Beijing’s leverage while strengthening economic and security partnerships throughout the region.

Whether such a strategy ultimately succeeds remains uncertain. China has spent decades building commercial relationships across Latin America, and many governments have become deeply dependent on Chinese trade and investment. Nevertheless, recent political developments have created an opportunity for Washington to begin rebuilding its influence.

The Monroe Doctrine for the Twenty First Century

The original Monroe Doctrine declared that foreign powers should not establish new spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere. While it did not prohibit trade or diplomacy, it asserted that outside attempts to dominate the Americas threatened U.S. security and regional stability.

Supporters of the Trump administration argue that today’s geopolitical environment presents a similar challenge. Rather than military conquest, Beijing has expanded its influence through economic dependence, control over strategic infrastructure, subsidized industries, and pressure campaigns against governments that resist its objectives.

According to recent reporting, the administration has increasingly treated Latin America as America’s primary strategic neighborhood. Former Trump adviser Mauricio Claver-Carone summarized the philosophy by stating, “You can’t be the pre-eminent global power if you’re not the pre-eminent regional power.” That perspective reflects an expectation that the United States must once again become the dominant economic and security partner throughout the hemisphere if it hopes to compete effectively with China.

Supporters point to several recent political developments that could strengthen this strategy. Colombia’s apparent election of Abelardo De La Espriella, known as “El Tigre,” could restore close security cooperation between Bogotá and Washington after years of strained relations. Peru’s conservative political movement has likewise emphasized stronger ties with the United States, while Venezuela’s changing political landscape has opened new opportunities for humanitarian and diplomatic engagement. Together, advocates argue these developments could provide Washington with important partners as it seeks to counter Beijing’s expanding influence throughout the region.

Where China Has Expanded Its Influence

China’s influence in Latin America extends far beyond trade. Across the region, governments and industries have raised concerns that Beijing combines economic incentives with political leverage, creating relationships that become increasingly difficult to escape.

Panama

Panama occupies one of the world’s most strategically important shipping corridors, making it a natural target for Chinese influence. According to the source material, Chinese authorities have subjected Panama flagged vessels to what critics describe as arbitrary inspections and commercial harassment. Secretary of State Marco Rubio condemned these actions, saying China’s retaliation “destabilizes supply chains, raises costs, and erodes confidence in the global trading system.” Because global commerce depends heavily on Panama’s maritime sector, supporters of a renewed Monroe Doctrine argue that protecting Panamanian sovereignty has become an important strategic objective for the United States.

Peru

Peru has become one of China’s most significant strategic partners in South America through investments in ports, mining projects, and industrial development. Critics argue that Beijing has sought preferential treatment while expanding its influence over key infrastructure. At the same time, Peruvian authorities have imposed five year anti dumping duties on Chinese steel after concluding that heavily subsidized imports were undercutting domestic producers. Supporters of closer U.S. ties believe Peru’s growing interest in stronger security cooperation with Washington could gradually reduce China’s ability to dominate the country’s strategic industries.

Ecuador

Ecuador is frequently cited by critics as an example of China’s debt driven investment model. The Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project has become a symbol of concerns surrounding inadequate oversight, financial dependence, and questions about project performance. Opponents argue that Chinese financing can create long term leverage over recipient governments while delivering infrastructure that fails to meet expectations. Advocates of greater American engagement argue that offering competitive investment alternatives could reduce the appeal of similar arrangements throughout Latin America.

Nicaragua

Perhaps nowhere is China’s expanding footprint more visible than in Nicaragua. According to the source material, Chinese owned mining companies now control concessions covering more than 1.2 million hectares, approximately ten percent of the country’s territory. Environmental organizations allege that many concessions overlap Indigenous and Afro descendant lands and were approved without meaningful consultation. Critics argue that the combination of authoritarian governance, resource extraction, and foreign investment demonstrates how Beijing can strengthen political allies while gaining access to valuable natural resources.

Brazil

Brazil has maintained extensive commercial ties with China, but even there concerns have grown over what domestic industry describes as unfair trade practices. Brazil’s steel industry has warned that record Chinese steel imports have driven down production, eliminated thousands of jobs, and reduced investment. Industry leaders argue that Chinese government subsidies allow producers to sell steel below production cost, making it difficult for Brazilian manufacturers to compete. Although Brazil has imposed trade defenses, business leaders continue calling for stronger action to prevent what they describe as predatory pricing that threatens the country’s industrial base.

Bolivia

Bolivia has long been viewed as one of China’s most important sources of strategic minerals, particularly lithium. Critics argue that previous governments granted Chinese firms preferential access to valuable mineral resources with limited transparency. According to the source material, Bolivia’s political shift in 2025 opened the door to renewed legal scrutiny of several Chinese lithium agreements. Indigenous communities have challenged the contracts, arguing that they failed to adequately protect local interests. Supporters of stronger U.S. engagement believe governments that diversify foreign investment will be better positioned to negotiate with Beijing on more equal terms.

Guatemala

Guatemala illustrates another form of Chinese leverage. Unlike many Latin American countries, Guatemala continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than Beijing. According to the source material, China has responded with trade barriers and commercial pressure intended to encourage Guatemala to abandon Taipei. Critics describe these measures as economic bullying designed to force diplomatic concessions through commercial means rather than negotiation. Advocates of a renewed American presence argue that providing reliable economic alternatives could make it easier for countries to resist that pressure while preserving independent foreign policy decisions.

Chile and Argentina

China’s growing economic reach has also generated concerns elsewhere in South America. Chilean officials have frozen a proposed submarine cable project involving China, while the United States has expressed concern over Chinese space facilities in both Chile and Argentina because of their potential dual civilian and military applications. Argentina has also investigated allegations that Chinese manufacturers were dumping wind turbine towers into its market at artificially low prices to undercut domestic producers. Together, these cases illustrate that Beijing’s influence increasingly extends beyond trade into strategic infrastructure, technology, and critical industries.

What a Modern Monroe Doctrine Could Mean

Supporters of President Trump argue that a renewed Monroe Doctrine would not seek to isolate Latin America from China. Instead, they envision creating enough American investment, trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement that countries throughout the region no longer feel compelled to rely primarily on Beijing.

Recent political developments could strengthen that strategy. Colombia’s apparent election of Abelardo De La Espriella has raised expectations of expanded intelligence sharing, military cooperation, and renewed security partnerships with Washington. In Peru, conservative leaders have advocated closer ties with the United States while emphasizing tougher law enforcement and pro-business policies. Venezuela’s improved relationship with Washington following its political transition has likewise opened opportunities for humanitarian cooperation and renewed diplomatic engagement. Supporters believe these developments could gradually form the foundation of a broader coalition of governments aligned more closely with the United States than with China.

Advocates also argue that stronger regional partnerships could help protect critical shipping routes, encourage more transparent investment standards, reduce dependence on subsidized Chinese industries, and provide countries with competitive alternatives to Chinese financing. Rather than forcing nations to choose sides, supporters believe greater American engagement would expand their options and strengthen their bargaining position.

Whether those expectations ultimately become reality remains uncertain. China remains deeply embedded throughout Latin America after years of investment in ports, mines, energy projects, manufacturing, telecommunications, and infrastructure. Reversing that influence will likely require sustained American attention over many years rather than a single diplomatic initiative.

Still, proponents believe the momentum may be shifting. Conservative governments have gained ground in several countries, while others are reconsidering the long term costs of dependence on Chinese capital and state subsidized industries. If Washington can continue building partnerships based on security cooperation, private investment, and economic opportunity, supporters argue that a modern Monroe Doctrine could gradually restore American influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.

For nearly two hundred years, the Monroe Doctrine reflected the belief that stability and security in the Americas were inseparable from the security of the United States. In the twenty first century, the challenge is no longer European colonialism but strategic competition with China. Whether the Trump administration can translate that historic principle into an effective modern strategy remains one of the most consequential geopolitical questions facing the Western Hemisphere.