Taiwan’s military is facing a growing internal threat that has nothing to do with missiles or ships. Taiwan’s own authorities say China’s spying operations are rapidly advancing, and that agents inside Taiwan could help Beijing in a real crisis. The fear is blunt: if China ever attacks, the people already planted inside Taiwan’s system could make that attack faster, more precise, and more destructive.
Taiwan’s government says the danger is rising because China is not only collecting secrets. It is also trying to weaken morale, sow distrust, and convince Taiwan’s public that their military will not fight. Taiwan Defense Minister Wellington Koo described it as something bigger than classic spying, calling it “less of an intelligence war and more like cognitive warfare.”
How China Recruits: Cheap Money, Easy Tech, Constant Pressure
Investigators and prosecutors describe a pattern that keeps repeating.
China targets people who are vulnerable, especially lower-ranking service members who are short on cash, in debt, or isolated. Recruiters use messaging apps, social media, and online loan offers. In one example described by a Taiwanese officer, a Facebook post claiming to represent a podcast offered small payments to anyone with a military background willing to share information.
Taiwan’s military has responded with warning posters on campuses that explain the tactics: charm through social media, offer money and business opportunities, and sometimes sexual favors. The posters also list the kinds of people seen as most vulnerable, including those who gamble, chase online dating, or live recklessly off duty.
David Hsu, a deputy head of Taiwan’s investigation bureau, said paying small amounts to lower-ranking soldiers can be “good value for the money.” That is part of what makes this threat so hard to stop. The price of betrayal can be shockingly low.
Case One: The Presidential Office Security Breach
One of the most alarming cases involved Sgt. Lai Chung-yu, who served in the military police battalion responsible for guarding the presidential office building and senior officials.
According to Taiwan authorities, Lai was in debt and searched online for a loan. A Chinese agent then hooked him with an offer of quick money. Lai used his cellphone to photograph sensitive security details. Later, court documents said he delivered photographs of documents and received payment in the cryptocurrency Tether.
This was not a one-person leak. After Lai risked losing access to valuable information, he recruited another sergeant and a corporal to keep the pipeline going. Over two years, the unit provided China with names and headshots of officials working in the building, guard rosters and call signs, and training materials that explained how the guards operated.
A soldier tipped off authorities in August 2024. Lai and three others were arrested in December 2024, convicted by March, and Lai was sentenced to seven years in prison. Prosecutors estimated Lai received about $15,000, and the others received similar amounts. Chief prosecutor Hsing Tai-chao said it was baffling because it was not even a large sum.
Security expert Lin Ying-yu of Tamkang University said this kind of information helps China “complete a big puzzle.” In a conflict, details like names, routines, access points, and procedures can be turned into targeting data.
Case Two: A Marine’s Allegiance Video and Paid Propaganda
Prosecutors charged a Marine sergeant with undermining national security after he allegedly recorded a video of himself pledging allegiance to the Beijing government while holding a Chinese flag. Prosecutors said he was paid more than $6,000 by someone in China for the video, and earned additional money by providing information about Taiwan’s weapons and amphibious vehicles.
Former CIA analyst Peter Mattis, now at the Jamestown Foundation, warned that cases like this do not just leak information. They also quietly damage confidence. They can undermine how much Taiwanese citizens trust their own military, and how much Taiwan’s partners trust Taiwan.
Case Three: Funding Armed Networks for Wartime Inside Help
Taiwan’s prosecutions are not limited to small leaks. There are also cases tied to a darker possibility: preparing internal support operations for wartime.
A retired lieutenant general received a 7½-year prison sentence for accepting Chinese funds and establishing an armed organization in Taiwan that would target military bases.
Separately, reporting described a case where retired Army Lieutenant General Gao and others were indicted for allegedly accepting Chinese Communist Party funding to establish armed groups that would act as internal operatives during wartime, working to subvert Taiwan’s government. Prosecutors found he sought significant funding and that the alleged goal was internal support for an invasion.
This is why some experts see a shift. It is not only about collecting secrets. It is about positioning assets to disrupt Taiwan from the inside at the moment it matters most.
Case Four: Tech Tricks Inside Secure Units
Taiwan’s watchdog and security assessments have highlighted new spy technology and how it is being used.
In one case, an air force sergeant used a Chinese-developed phone app to bypass military security software and photograph classified documents.
In another case, a Taiwan businessman used mapping technology to survey roads, documenting buildings, distances, and other data investigators said could support Chinese wargames or military planning.
Investigators also warn that modern smartphones, with high-quality cameras and constant connectivity, make spying easier and detection harder. A single person with a phone can capture a lot, very quickly.
Case Five: Spy Rings and Information Leaks Around Major Exercises
A separate analysis described a 10-person military spy ring broken up in 2024 that targeted Taiwan’s Han Kuang exercises and allegedly leaked plans via Telegram for cash payments.
These are not random targets. Han Kuang is central to Taiwan’s preparation for a possible invasion scenario. Leaking training and planning details can help China understand Taiwan’s assumptions, readiness, and weak points.
The Numbers Behind the Alarm
Taiwan’s National Security Bureau reported that prosecutors filed charges in 2024 against 64 people in 15 cases of alleged Chinese espionage, compared with three cases in 2021.
Nearly two-thirds of those charged were military personnel, active or retired. Defense Minister Wellington Koo said nearly 90% of military cases came from internal tips, which suggests Taiwan’s counterintelligence awareness is improving, but also that the problem is widespread enough that it keeps being discovered from within.
64 well placed agents in a relatively small military can be a massive amount of compromise and control – enough to turn battles. And 64 is likely the tip of the iceberg.
What Beijing Is Trying to Do, Beyond Stealing Secrets
Multiple officials and experts describe China’s effort as preparation, not curiosity.
Kerry Gershaneck, a former U.S. counterintelligence official, said Beijing is not “benignly collecting information,” and that it is being used in preparation for annexing Taiwan.
Taiwan’s own president described the broader strategy in a March statement, saying China uses Taiwan’s democratic openness to recruit gangs, the media, commentators, political parties, and active-duty and retired military and police, aiming to “divide, destroy and subvert” Taiwan from within.
This is where “cognitive warfare” matters. If China can convince Taiwanese citizens that the military is compromised, or convince Taiwan’s partners that Taiwan cannot protect secrets, Taiwan’s ability to deter war weakens even before a shot is fired.
Experts on the Consequences
U.S. and Taiwan-focused security voices warn that infiltration could have battlefield consequences.
Dennis Wilder, a former National Security Council director for China, said the level of penetration and intensity of Chinese efforts have gone up.
Andrew Nien-dzu Yang, a former Taiwan defense minister, warned that it is getting worse and that high-level spies can cause serious damage.
A former Taiwan-focused U.S. intelligence official warned that through a major penetration or cumulative penetrations, China could have a major intelligence advantage in a war involving Taiwan and, by extension, the United States.
Retired Admiral Mike Studeman said the stakes are higher, and framed the danger as China seeking saboteurs and possibly people willing to conduct targeted attacks on senior officials.
This concern connects directly to cases involving presidential security arrangements. If China can identify and track key officials and their protection details, it could shape opening moves in a conflict.
President Lai’s 17-Point National Security Initiative
Taiwan’s leadership is treating espionage as a national-level threat, not just a law-enforcement issue.
President Lai announced a 17-point initiative aimed at countering Chinese Communist Party infiltration threats. The initiative defined the CCP as a “hostile external force” and included enhanced military counter-infiltration measures.
The broader response described alongside this initiative included:
- Expanding the military’s counterintelligence capacity
- Revising procedures for access to classified information
- Partially restoring military tribunals focused on severe offenses like treason and collaboration
- Amending veterans-related rules, including expanding restrictions and suspending benefits for those implicated
- Restructuring the military judicial system to close legal gaps and improve prosecution of internal national security threats
- Building a personnel vetting and security clearance framework, including review of digital file records, to detect internal risks and guide assignments
The initiative was also framed to signal to the public and to international partners that Taiwan is determined to resist covert influence and infiltration, not only external military pressure.
All of these are worth initiatives, but they will not help if the level of penetration is to high – in fact they may serve to entrench Chinese agents by adding layers of security to hide behind.
Taiwanese Officials
Taiwan’s security authorities say the threat is growing and involves complex operations and new technology that together pose a potentially serious national security risk.
Defense Minister Wellington Koo has emphasized that the challenge is not only intelligence collection but also trust, morale, and manipulation of perception.
Chief prosecutor Hsing Tai-chao highlighted a painful reality in the presidential office case: sometimes the payments are small, but the damage can be enormous.
Why This Threat Cuts So Deep
Taiwan is preparing for the possibility of military coercion from China, but espionage creates a different kind of vulnerability. It attacks the system from within: personnel, procedures, morale, and trust between Taiwan and its allies.
The recent cases show a spectrum, from quick smartphone photos for small payments, to propaganda pledges meant to demoralize the public, to alleged planning for armed networks that could support China during wartime.
Taiwan’s arrests and new countermeasures suggest a government moving faster and taking the problem more seriously. But the cases also show why officials describe the threat as advancing quickly. The same openness that makes Taiwan democratic also gives Beijing more room to operate.
For Taiwan, countering China’s spy machine is no longer a side mission. It is part of whether the island can still defend itself when it matters most.
ACZ Editor: Intelligence is a force multiplier. If Taiwan is truly penetrated to the extent that these patterns indicate, in a battle Taiwan is toast.