For more than a decade, China and Syria under Bashar al-Assad were close political partners. Beijing defended Assad at the United Nations, supported Syria’s sovereignty during the civil war, and viewed Damascus as part of China’s broader Middle East strategy. Syria was also seen as a potential link in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, giving Beijing strategic access to the Mediterranean and another foothold in the Arab world.

But today that relationship is under severe strain. The biggest reason is the growing role of Uyghur fighters inside Syria’s new government and military. China now sees Syria not as a stable ally, but as a country increasingly influenced by men Beijing considers dangerous extremists.

The collapse of Assad’s regime in late 2024 fundamentally changed the balance of power. Many of the rebel fighters who helped overthrow Assad included Uyghurs from western China’s Xinjiang region. These fighters became some of the most effective forces in the war. According to researcher Aaron Zelin, the Uyghurs were “some of the most battle-hardened folks” in Syria.

The Uyghur fighters were largely connected to the Turkestan Islamic Party, or TIP, a militant Islamist organization made up mostly of ethnic Uyghurs from China. Thousands of Uyghurs and their families had migrated into northern Syria beginning around 2012, often entering through Turkey. Initially, many claimed they came simply for military training and survival after fleeing repression in China.

Over time, however, they became deeply involved in Syria’s civil war. They fought alongside Sunni Islamist groups against Assad’s forces and earned a reputation for discipline and toughness. Uyghur units participated in some of the war’s most important battles, including the successful 2024 offensive that helped bring down Assad’s government. One dramatic operation involved Uyghur fighters secretly clearing a two-mile tunnel behind Syrian government lines before attacking regime troops near Aleppo from behind.

After Assad fell, Syria’s new government rewarded the Uyghurs for their loyalty. Former TIP fighters were integrated into Syria’s reconstituted national army, and several Uyghur commanders received senior military positions. Reports indicate that roughly 3,500 foreign fighters, most of them Uyghurs, were absorbed into Syria’s new 84th Division. Some reportedly became brigadier generals and colonels.

This development deeply alarmed Beijing.

For years, China justified its harsh security policies in Xinjiang by arguing that Uyghur militant groups posed a terrorist threat. Now those same fighters are not hiding in caves or rebel camps. They were wearing official Syrian military uniforms and serving in the government of a country China once considered a partner.

Chinese officials reacted publicly and aggressively. China’s UN ambassador Fu Cong warned Syria to fulfill its “counterterrorism obligations” and prevent “terrorist forces” from using Syrian territory to threaten other countries. Beijing repeatedly called out the Turkestan Islamic Party by name and expressed concern over foreign fighters being promoted inside Syria’s military establishment.

China’s concern is not simply theoretical. Many Uyghur fighters openly describe China as their true enemy. Several told NPR they were driven to Syria by hatred toward the Chinese government and by what they viewed as systematic repression in Xinjiang. One fighter said, “China forced us into this.” Another explained that many Uyghurs hoped one day to build enough military experience to eventually “liberate” Xinjiang from Chinese rule.

These fears connect directly to China’s policies inside Xinjiang. Beginning around 2017, Chinese authorities dramatically expanded a system of detention camps, surveillance programs, forced labor systems, and political indoctrination campaigns targeting Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities. Human rights organizations and the United Nations accused Beijing of severe abuses. In 2021, the United States officially labeled China’s actions a genocide.

Uyghurs interviewed for the reporting described family separations, mass arrests, constant surveillance, and discrimination. Some said they believed peaceful protest was hopeless after crackdowns in 1990, 1997, and especially the violent unrest in Xinjiang during 2009.

China rejects accusations of genocide and insists its programs are necessary to combat extremism and separatism. But Beijing now faces a difficult irony. The very militants it claimed justified its hardline Xinjiang policies have become heroes in Syria’s new ruling coalition.

This has pushed China into an uncomfortable strategic position. During Assad’s years, Syria was reliably part of the broader Chinese and Russian geopolitical axis opposing Western influence. Beijing shielded Assad diplomatically and hoped eventually to profit from Syrian reconstruction projects tied to the Belt and Road Initiative.

Now China no longer trusts Damascus.

Beijing has deliberately held back from fully embracing Syria’s new government. Chinese analysts describe the current strategy as “risk management” rather than partnership. China has slowed reconstruction investments, maintained pressure at the United Nations, and signaled that normalization depends on Syria addressing the Uyghur issue.

At the same time, Syria appears increasingly unwilling to fully comply with Chinese demands. The new government sees the Uyghur fighters as loyal allies who helped save the rebellion from defeat. Syrian officials have even defended them publicly, saying they “pose neither an internal nor an external threat.”

The United States has also played a role in Syria’s changing posture. Reports indicate Washington has tacitly accepted the integration of foreign fighters into Syria’s military as part of a broader strategy to limit future Chinese influence. Meanwhile, U.S. and European sanctions relief has opened the door for Syria to seek investment from Gulf states and Turkey instead of relying heavily on Beijing.

As a result, Syria is drifting away from China’s orbit. The old Assad-era relationship based on anti-Western alignment and diplomatic loyalty is fading. In its place is a far more unstable reality where Syria’s new rulers are balancing between foreign powers while relying on fighters that China deeply fears.

For Beijing, the loss is both strategic and symbolic. China spent years defending Assad in the name of stability and counterterrorism. Now Assad is gone, and the men who helped replace him are the very militants China spent decades trying to suppress.