ACZ Editor: We are presenting this as an alternative opinion on the readiness and purpose of China’s military. We don’t concur with the conclusions of this report and in fact believe that while China’s military has substantial problems, China is ready and willing to go to war with the intention of winning.

A recent report by Timothy Heath of the RAND Corporation challenges conventional wisdom about China’s military prowess. Despite rapid modernization and a growing arsenal of advanced weaponry, the report argues that the primary mission of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not preparing for war but upholding the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This assertion carries profound implications for Taiwan, U.S. military strategy, and global security.

Heath states in his report, The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness, that “China’s military modernization gains are designed first and foremost to bolster the appeal and credibility of CCP rule.” This perspective raises significant doubts about whether the PLA is truly prepared for large-scale war, despite its formidable appearance.

Signs That China’s Military is Not Ready for War

China’s military buildup is impressive on paper. The PLA boasts the world’s largest navy, an expanding nuclear arsenal, and cutting-edge hypersonic missiles. Yet, Heath’s report highlights several factors that call into question the PLA’s actual combat readiness:

• Political Indoctrination Over Training: Up to 40% of the PLA’s training time is devoted to political education rather than combat skills. “The trade-off in time that could be spent mastering the essential skills for combat operations further raises questions as to how well prepared the PLA might be for modern war,” Heath explains.
• Divided Command Structure: PLA units are led not only by military officers but also by political commissars, whose role is to enforce party ideology. Heath notes that “a divided command system … reduces the ability of commanders to respond flexibly and rapidly to emerging situations.”
• Lack of Wartime Experience: The PLA has not fought a major war since the 1979 conflict with Vietnam. While it conducts large-scale exercises, history has shown that peacetime drills do not always translate to effective wartime performance. Heath draws a comparison to Russia’s struggles in Ukraine, where a better-equipped force failed due to poor leadership and strategic errors.
• Corruption and Bureaucracy: Despite Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaigns, the PLA continues to suffer from deeply ingrained corruption, affecting procurement, promotions, and overall efficiency. Heath states that “corruption is extensive and involves routine fraud, including fake and defective weaponry and falsified training certifications and records, that compromises the military’s ability to fight in a war.”
• Lack of War Mobilization: Unlike past regimes preparing for war, China’s leaders have made no efforts to rally public support for military action. There is no indication that Beijing is preparing its population for large-scale conflict, which suggests war is not a priority. “Chinese leaders have made no speeches that glorify war, advocate for war, or otherwise characterize war as inevitable or desirable,” Heath notes.

Consequences for Taiwan

For Taiwan, the RAND report provides both reassurance and caution. On the one hand, if the PLA is as politically constrained as Heath suggests, then a full-scale invasion of Taiwan remains a risky and uncertain prospect for China. Military planners in Beijing may fear that an actual conflict could expose weaknesses, resulting in a prolonged war or even internal instability.

However, Taiwan cannot afford complacency. While an outright invasion may not be imminent, China has other options to exert pressure:

• Naval Blockade: The PLA Navy could strangle Taiwan’s economy by cutting off key shipping lanes without firing a shot.
• Cyber and Hybrid Warfare: China’s capabilities in cyber warfare, economic coercion, and political interference provide non-military avenues to destabilize Taiwan.
• Gray Zone Tactics: Continuous air and naval incursions, military exercises near Taiwan, and diplomatic isolation efforts can wear down Taiwan’s defenses and morale over time.

According to Heath, “China’s military modernization gains are not designed to conquer Taiwan through military attack. Instead, (they are) designed to help the PLA more effectively carry out its longstanding mission of upholding CCP rule.” This suggests that while the military threat is real, it is only one component of Beijing’s broader strategy to bring Taiwan under its control.

China’s Perspective: Control Over Combat Readiness

From Beijing’s viewpoint, the PLA’s primary mission is to safeguard the CCP’s rule. Historically, China’s military has played a crucial role in maintaining domestic stability rather than projecting power abroad. The Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 and more recent anti-corruption purges within the PLA highlight the party’s reliance on the military for internal control.

While China’s leadership undoubtedly wants Taiwan to reunite with the mainland, the report suggests that war is not the preferred method. Instead, Beijing appears to be playing a long game—waiting for an opportunity to coerce Taiwan into submission through political and economic means rather than risking a disastrous military conflict.

Heath argues that “the CCP does value Taiwan unification but cares more about urgent, largely domestic social, political, and economic threats to CCP rule.” This means that China’s true priority is not military conquest, but ensuring internal stability and the survival of the party.

Conclusion: A Different Kind of Threat

The RAND report challenges the assumption that China’s military buildup signals an imminent war. Instead, the PLA’s modernization serves a dual purpose: deterring external threats while reinforcing domestic political control.

For U.S. policymakers and military strategists, this means that while preparing for a conventional war with China is necessary, they must also consider alternative threats, such as cyber attacks, economic coercion, and China’s influence operations worldwide.

For Taiwan, the message is clear: while a full-scale invasion may not be likely in the near future, the threat remains real in other forms. Strengthening asymmetric defenses, enhancing cybersecurity, and deepening alliances with democratic partners will be key to countering Beijing’s long-term strategy.

Ultimately, China’s military power may be formidable, but its true purpose lies not in battlefield dominance but in securing the rule of the Communist Party. Understanding this distinction is crucial to navigating the complexities of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations in the years ahead.

ACZ Editor: Naturally China would follow the philosophies of Sun Tzu, but suggesting that China has no intention of fighting a war is not the smartest thinking. China will not fight as long as it is making progress without it, but our view is that China will attempt to take Taiwan and more militarily as soon as other methods are not working.