A report from the Brookings Institution titled Stabilizer or Spoiler? The China Factor in the North Korea Nuclear Dilemma by Jeffrey Feltman, Jennifer Hong Whetsell, Patricia M. Kim, Randall G. Schriver, and Andrew Yeo—convened by Ryan Hass, Patricia M. Kim, and Emilie Kimball—examines China’s complex and often contradictory role in the North Korea nuclear crisis. The scholars explain that while both Washington and Beijing claim to support denuclearization, neither seems to treat it as an urgent priority. The report explores how China’s relationship with North Korea shapes the region’s security, the growing influence of Russia, and the fading prospects for cooperation with the United States.

North Korea’s deepening cooperation with Russia is the most alarming development. The partnership accelerates North Korea’s nuclear and technological capabilities, including missile and space programs. This strengthens Kim Jong Un’s sense of global legitimacy and fuels his risk-taking behavior. China, while wary of regional instability, has tolerated this partnership to counter U.S. influence. Its reluctance to intervene effectively allows Pyongyang’s confidence and nuclear capabilities to grow unchecked, undermining collective security efforts.

China’s Enabling Role Behind the Scenes

Beijing publicly supports denuclearization but its actions suggest otherwise. While China fears chaos on its border, it also benefits from keeping the United States preoccupied with North Korea. Xi Jinping’s recent meeting with Kim Jong Un emphasized friendship and cooperation but omitted denuclearization entirely. This marks a shift from past Chinese diplomacy and signals that Beijing now prioritizes influence over restraint. China’s passive stance allows Pyongyang to expand its nuclear arsenal without consequence, reinforcing instability.

North Korea’s nuclear threat has evolved beyond warheads to advanced delivery systems. The testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles like the Hwaseong-17 and development of the Hwaseong-20 give Pyongyang the capability to strike the U.S. mainland. A new ballistic missile submarine further enhances its strike options. Despite China’s concerns about U.S. missile defenses in the region, Beijing has shown little urgency in addressing North Korea’s escalating missile tests. This neglect increases the risk of a future military miscalculation in East Asia.

Diverging U.S. and Chinese Interests

Although Washington and Beijing share an interest in avoiding war, their strategic goals diverge sharply. The United States seeks denuclearization and security for its allies South Korea and Japan, while China’s priority is limiting U.S. military presence. Beijing tolerates low-level North Korean provocations as long as they keep U.S. forces occupied on the Korean Peninsula. Shared aversions rather than shared ambitions define this uneasy balance, leaving little room for meaningful coordination or sanctions enforcement.

Once partners in nonproliferation, the U.S. and China have grown adversarial on North Korea policy. Beijing abstained from renewing the U.N. committee enforcing sanctions after Russia vetoed it in 2024, prioritizing its partnership with Moscow over regional security. This marked a turning point. China’s preference for inaction and its framing of the nuclear issue as an American problem have created a policy vacuum. The lack of unified pressure allows North Korea to expand its capabilities without restraint.

The Russia Factor and Beijing’s Diminished Leverage

Russia’s alliance with North Korea, formalized through a defense pact, has shifted the regional balance. Moscow’s military and technological support emboldens Kim and reduces China’s leverage. Beijing is uneasy about Pyongyang’s growing dependence on Moscow but unwilling to confront Russia directly. This triangle leaves China sidelined, forced to balance its need for Russian partnership against the erosion of its influence over North Korea. For the U.S., this complicates any hope of cooperative diplomacy with China.

The United States has little ability to shape China’s policies toward North Korea. Decades of experience show Beijing’s priorities are fixed—regime stability, border security, and containment of U.S. influence. Experts argue Washington’s best strategy is to strengthen its alliances with South Korea and Japan. A united front increases diplomatic pressure and forces Beijing to weigh broader consequences. Without such alignment, China’s approach will remain reactive, self-interested, and focused on its rivalry with the United States rather than the nuclear threat itself.

Beijing could play a decisive role in constraining North Korea’s nuclear ambitions if it chose to use its economic leverage. Yet, China acts only when instability threatens its interests or when it risks exclusion from key diplomatic processes. While U.S. pressure could elevate North Korea on the bilateral agenda, trade and great-power rivalry dominate current relations. Unless Washington and Beijing recalibrate their priorities, North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities will continue unchecked, raising the risk of a crisis neither side can control.

ACZ Editor: China will not act toward de-nuking North Korea as long as it might be useful in negotiations. And that will be useful for a long time.