For years, American policymakers have focused on China’s strengths. They have watched the rise of the world’s second-largest economy, the expansion of the People’s Liberation Army, the growth of Chinese technology firms, and Beijing’s increasingly assertive foreign policy. But a new article in Foreign Affairs argues that Washington may have been looking at only half the picture. Behind China’s impressive rise lie vulnerabilities that could become powerful sources of leverage if the United States is willing to recognize and exploit them.
Foreign Affairs is not a publication known for alarmism. Published by the Council on Foreign Relations, it has long been one of the most influential journals in American foreign policy, read by diplomats, military officers, intelligence professionals, academics, and policymakers. When its contributors discuss great-power competition, they tend to do so from a strategic rather than ideological perspective. Their latest argument is not that China is about to collapse. It is that the United States has spent decades preparing to defend itself against Beijing while largely neglecting opportunities to build leverage of its own.
The article begins with a warning. During the trade confrontation between Washington and Beijing in 2025, China demonstrated just how much leverage it possessed. While tariffs grabbed headlines, Beijing responded by tightening restrictions on rare earth minerals that are essential to everything from smartphones to advanced weapons systems. Because China dominates global rare earth processing, American policymakers suddenly found themselves confronting a painful reality. The United States had tools to pressure China, but China possessed tools that could pressure America as well.
The lesson, according to the article, is not simply that America needs more secure supply chains. The deeper lesson is that Beijing has spent years studying American vulnerabilities while Washington has been far less interested in studying China’s. As strategist Thomas Schelling famously observed, “The power to hurt is bargaining power.” China understands this concept well. The authors argue that it is time for the United States to understand it just as clearly.
What makes the argument particularly interesting is that it focuses on weaknesses that many observers overlook. China appears formidable from the outside, but beneath the surface there are significant fault lines. The country’s economy faces slowing growth, weak domestic consumption, mounting debt, a struggling real estate sector, high youth unemployment, and a rapidly aging population. Its military remains largely untested in combat and has wrestled with corruption scandals. The Chinese Communist Party has become increasingly dependent on surveillance, censorship, and propaganda to maintain social stability.
China’s international position also contains vulnerabilities. Despite years of efforts to become more self-sufficient, Beijing still relies heavily on foreign technology, imported energy, overseas markets, and access to the global financial system. China has territorial disputes with many of its neighbors and only one formal treaty ally, North Korea. None of these weaknesses suggest imminent decline, but together they paint a picture of a rising power that is not nearly as invulnerable as many assume.
One area where the article sees immediate opportunity is technology. Advanced semiconductors have become the foundation of modern military power, artificial intelligence, and cyber capabilities. The United States and its allies still control critical choke points in the semiconductor supply chain, from chip design software to manufacturing equipment. Restricting China’s access to these technologies does not permanently stop Beijing’s ambitions, but it forces Chinese leaders to spend more money, more time, and more effort pursuing them. That alone can provide a strategic advantage.
The authors argue that this principle should guide a broader competitive strategy. The goal is not to cripple China but to force Beijing to devote resources toward solving difficult problems rather than expanding its military power or increasing pressure on its neighbors. Every dollar spent overcoming technology restrictions is a dollar that cannot be spent elsewhere. Every effort devoted to replacing foreign suppliers diverts energy from other priorities.
Trade presents another opportunity. China’s manufacturing machine has become one of the defining features of the global economy. Nearly one-third of the world’s goods are produced there. Yet this strength creates its own dependency. Domestic consumption remains relatively weak, leaving China heavily dependent on foreign markets to absorb its industrial output. In 2025, China recorded a staggering $1.2 trillion trade surplus, the largest ever recorded by a single economy. That success demonstrates economic power, but it also reveals a reliance on exports that could become a strategic liability.
The article proposes building coalitions of developed and developing nations to push back against Chinese industrial policies. Coordinated trade measures, investment restrictions, and stronger enforcement mechanisms could limit Beijing’s ability to dominate strategic industries while encouraging alternative manufacturing centers around the world.
Perhaps the most striking sections focus on vulnerabilities that would only be relevant during a major crisis. China remains deeply integrated into the dollar-based financial system. Much of its trade is conducted in dollars, a large portion of its reserves are held in dollar-denominated assets, and Chinese firms remain dependent on access to global financial networks. Despite years of discussion about replacing the dollar, Beijing has made only limited progress because meaningful alternatives would require economic reforms the Communist Party has been unwilling to undertake.
China’s dependence on imported energy is another concern. Roughly three-quarters of its crude oil comes from abroad, most of it transported through vulnerable maritime chokepoints. Beijing has worked for decades to reduce this vulnerability, yet it remains a major strategic concern for Chinese planners. The article argues that understanding such weaknesses can strengthen deterrence even if those tools are never used.
The final element of the strategy may be the most novel. The authors argue that many of China’s international activities depend on secrecy. Influence operations, political pressure campaigns, propaganda efforts, and coercive tactics often lose effectiveness once exposed to public scrutiny. Beijing invests heavily in shaping narratives around the world, but those efforts become liabilities when governments, journalists, and citizens see them clearly.
The article points to successful efforts by countries such as the Philippines, which publicly documented Chinese maritime harassment and transformed an abstract territorial dispute into visible evidence of coercion. The broader lesson is that transparency itself can become a strategic tool. As the authors put it, “The CCP’s greatest vulnerability is perhaps its simplest: it cannot bear to be seen for what it is.”
The overall message is not one of confrontation for confrontation’s sake. Rather, it is a recognition that successful competition requires more than simply defending against an adversary’s strengths. It also requires understanding and exploiting that adversary’s weaknesses. Foreign Affairs is essentially arguing that China has spent years building leverage over the United States. Washington now needs to do the same. The authors believe that if America combines domestic renewal, strong alliances, technological leadership, and carefully developed leverage, it can shape the U.S.-China competition from a position of greater strength and stability.