China’s leader Xi Jinping is waging what one report calls an “internal political war” inside the People’s Liberation Army. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, through its ChinaPower Project, says the removals are not just a handful of famous names. They are widespread enough to gut the PLA’s senior leadership and reshape how China’s military is run. The CSIS ChinaPower Project built a “CSIS Database of Chinese Military Purges” to track what has happened since 2022, and its conclusion is blunt: the purge is “far more extensive than previously understood.”

CSIS is the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a policy research organization whose ChinaPower Project focuses on China-related analysis. Because China’s system is opaque, CSIS says there had not been a systematic assessment of PLA purges before. Its database only includes generals and lieutenant generals, because open-source information below those ranks is limited, but even with that constraint CSIS still tracks more than 100 senior officers who were purged or potentially purged since 2022.

New Information from the CSIS

Before this report, most public attention focused on high-profile disappearances and dismissals near the top, especially in the Central Military Commission. CSIS says that focus “only scratches the surface.”

CSIS data and analysis says 36 generals and lieutenant generals have been officially purged since 2022. It also identifies 65 additional officers who are missing and “potentially purged,” based on their absence at major meetings where they were expected to appear. Added together, CSIS says that brings the total of confirmed and potential purges since 2022 to 101 people.

CSIS frames the shift as a second, more aggressive wave. “Around 2023, Xi initiated a second major round of purges, this time far bolder and more extensive than before,” the report says.

The Top of the House Was Hit First

CSIS says Xi has repeatedly purged military leaders since coming to power in 2012, initially targeting major figures such as former Central Military Commission vice chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, along with sitting CMC members Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang.

In the more recent wave, CSIS says Xi purged six members of the CMC, including former defense ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, plus He Weidong, Miao Hua, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Youxia. CSIS says their removal “decimated the PLA’s high command,” leaving only one sitting general on the CMC, Zhang Shengmin, who was promoted to vice chairman in late 2025.

CSIS also notes the official rhetoric used to justify removals. PLA Daily said Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were removed for fueling “political and corruption problems that threaten the party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces,” and accused them of having “seriously trampled on and undermined” Xi’s authority as CMC chairman.

CSIS uses several statistics to show how extreme this has become:

• It says that of 47 PLA leaders who were generals in 2022 or promoted to three-star positions after 2022, 41 of them, or 87 percent, were purged or potentially purged.
• It says that of 35 three-star generals and admirals Xi promoted from 2020 onward, 32 appear to have been investigated, and 29 were confirmed or potentially purged.
• Taylor Fravel is cited noting there are 176 billets designated for senior PLA leaders, and CSIS says the purged and potentially purged individuals represent “approximately 52 percent of positions in the PLA leadership.”

CSIS says these numbers show that “no one in the PLA is immune or shielded,” including people Xi promoted rapidly and even “princelings” with long ties to Xi’s family.

CSIS says corruption is a major stated driver, because Xi sees corruption as an obstacle to military modernization. But CSIS also says corruption charges do not explain the full scope. The removals also appear tied to political loyalty, factional struggles, performance concerns, and fears about independent patronage networks inside the PLA.

One of CSIS’s clearest themes is that the PLA exists to serve the Communist Party, not the state, and Xi views the military “first and foremost through the lens of regime security.” Another section of the supplied material describes the broader discipline environment across the party state, quoting Xi: “Corruption is a major obstacle and a stumbling block in the advancement of the party and the nation’s causes.”

In that context, the purge becomes a way to enforce obedience and prevent any rival power center from forming inside the armed forces.

Service Branches: Who Got Hit and Where

CSIS says the purges have impacted all four PLA services and parts of the support forces. It reports 11 active duty leaders from the services have been officially purged, and another 16 appear potentially purged or under investigation. CSIS says at least one commander and one political commissar have been purged or are under investigation in every service branch.

Rocket Force
CSIS says the Rocket Force has been targeted “the hardest, by a wide margin.” It states that all four of its past commanders have been officially purged. CSIS ties this to an investigation into corrupt procurement that may date back to the Rocket Force’s creation in 2015, and it stresses that the branch’s control of “China’s strategic nuclear missiles” adds scrutiny.

Army
CSIS says the Army was the second hardest hit. It describes a concentrated wave in 2024 and 2025, including the purge of two commanders, two political commissars, four deputy commanders, and one chief of staff in quick succession.

Navy
CSIS says purges in the Navy closely follow the Army. It describes corruption and capability shortfalls linked to the rapid buildup of the fleet. CSIS highlights the “sinking of the first Zhou-class nuclear submarine” during preparations for sea trials in Wuhan in mid-2024 and says analysts criticized design flaws in China’s Fujian aircraft carrier.

Air Force
CSIS says only one Air Force leader, former commander Ding Laihang, has been officially purged, and he was retired at the time. It says three other active duty Air Force officials may be under investigation. CSIS suggests the lower purge rate could indicate Xi has higher confidence in the Air Force, and it points to a notable 2025 outcome: the only two leaders promoted to three-star generals were from the Air Force.

Support Forces
CSIS says the four support forces, covering aerospace, cyberspace, information, and logistics, have been targeted to a lesser degree. It says the 2024-established Cyberspace Force leadership has been spared so far. It adds that the Aerospace Force and Information Support Force retained commanders, but the political commissar of the Information Support Force was likely purged, and it is unclear whether the Aerospace Force currently has a political commissar. CSIS says the Joint Logistics Support Force was hit harder, with top operational and political leaders purged or potentially purged.

Theater Commands: The Regional Commanders Were Not Spared

CSIS says that since 2022, China has purged or potentially purged the top two leaders, the commander and political commissar, of almost all five theater commands. It notes one exception where the former Central Theater Commander Wang Qiang disappeared, likely faced investigation, then reappeared and was replaced.

CSIS says the Southern Theater Command was hit hardest, losing a commander, a political commissar, and five deputy commanders, many of whom also held dual roles leading regional service components. CSIS says the top two positions remain vacant there, and it suggests the drivers are likely mixed, including corruption, capability shortfalls, and factionalism.

It also notes that former Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang is the only theater commander formally expelled from the CCP so far, while other cases involve dismissals, suspensions, or leaders who are missing.

CMC Subsidiary Organizations: The Planners and Operators Were Targeted

CSIS describes fifteen functional subsidiaries and the Joint Operations Command Center under the CMC, and says 17 senior leaders from these bodies were purged or potentially purged since 2022. It reports that the Joint Staff Department was hit hardest, including the purge of its chief Liu Zhenli and four deputies. CSIS also says the Political Work Department, Joint Operations Command Center, and Discipline Inspection Commission each had two leaders purged.

This matters because these bodies handle combat planning, joint operations, and training. Removing their leadership can damage the PLA’s ability to plan and execute complex operations.

People’s Armed Police: Domestic Control Gets Swept In Too

The supplied material also describes high-level expulsions involving the People’s Armed Police. It names Gen. Zhang Hongbin, political commissar of the People’s Armed Police, as removed from the National People’s Congress membership, and ties his disappearance to months of rumors and conspicuous absences. It also describes Wang Chunning, commander of the People’s Armed Police Force, as part of a group of “fallen nine” in another summary.

Whatever the exact procedural path, the message is consistent across the material: institutions central to domestic control are treated as “non-negotiable” in loyalty terms.

What This Does to Readiness: Daily Operations Continue, Big Exercises Slip

CSIS says the purges removed a large share of operational commanders. It reports that 61 percent of active duty senior leaders in its database came from the operational track, and says 80 percent of the officials purged from the CMC were in key operational roles. CSIS calls that “incredibly impactful” because it leaves the current CMC without an operational-track uniformed leader.

Even so, CSIS says the purges “have not significantly disrupted normal PLA functions or operations” so far. It points to the PLA’s centralized bureaucracy and the ability to backfill positions with acting leaders.

But CSIS also points to warning signs in complex planning:

• It says China’s two large-scale exercises around Taiwan in 2025 were delayed compared to 2024. CSIS notes it took 19 days to launch a major April 2025 exercise after a Taiwan presidential speech, and 12 days to launch a December 2025 response to a U.S. arms sale. It describes the April drill as more hastily organized and labeled a drill rather than a typical larger exercise.
• It says exercises with Russia dropped sharply in 2025, to six from fourteen in 2024, and that complex multi-domain exercises were missing. CSIS suggests the purges in the Joint Staff Department may have undercut planning capacity, noting that several deputy chiefs were likely purged in 2025, followed by the purge of Liu Zhenli in early 2026.

CSIS’s overall judgment is that acting leaders can maintain smaller daily operations, but there is evidence the purge is hurting the PLA’s ability to run larger, more complex activities.

Across the supplied material, the purge functions like a loyalty test and a warning system.

CSIS says Xi will likely prioritize political loyalty alongside competence as he refills the leadership, and it warns that the candidate pool has narrowed sharply, shaping how quickly the PLA can develop experienced operational leaders. Another section of the supplied material frames the broader discipline machine as reaching “industrial scale,” with party authorities disciplining 983,000 people in 2025, and it emphasizes that enforcement now targets “inaction and disloyalty,” not just graft.

Other expert commentary in the provided text captures the logic and the risk. Neil Thomas is quoted calling the move “a political show of force,” warning it can make the system “more obedient, but also more brittle.” Another cited voice, Lyle Goldstein, is described as saying removals at that level were almost unprecedented. A separate summary argues that Xi is pursuing loyalty so intensely that it signals fear and mistrust, not confidence.

What Comes Next: A Narrow Bench and Big Choices

CSIS says that after “gutting the PLA’s leadership,” Xi now has to rebuild the high command. It says he must weigh political loyalty and competence, and it suggests the restructuring could take years.

CSIS notes that besides Zhang Shengmin, it identifies only three three-star generals from which Xi could immediately choose: Admiral Dong Jun, General Yang Zhibin, and General Han Shengyan. It also notes that when comparing the CCP Central Committee roster to the CSIS purge database, only 17 members and alternates remained unblemished out of 67 originally on the committee.

CSIS also says Xi could reach beyond that pool, citing how he previously elevated He Weidong by skipping a grade and without Central Committee membership.

CSIS’s core finding is not just that Xi is purging. It is that the purge is wide enough to transform the PLA’s leadership class and potentially reshape China’s ability to modernize and respond in a crisis. For now, CSIS says daily PLA activity continues, but the signs of strain show up where it matters most: high-end planning, complex exercises, and leadership continuity.

Xi may gain tighter political control in the short term, but the report’s numbers, the vacancies, and the reliance on acting commanders all point to the same tradeoff. The more Xi uses purges to enforce loyalty, the more he risks building a military leadership culture shaped by fear, narrower talent pipelines, and delayed decision-making when speed and competence matter most.