Xi’s Purges Raise Questions About Combat Readiness and Political Priorities

A Military in Turmoil

A new wave of purges sweeping through the senior ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is raising serious questions about whether China is prepared for a major conflict, especially over Taiwan. Writing for Foreign Affairs, M. Taylor Fravel, Director of the Security Studies Program at MIT, argues that China’s internal military shakeups could significantly weaken its operational readiness just as President Xi Jinping presses for military modernization by 2027.

Since the 20th Party Congress in 2022, more than 20 senior officers from all branches of the PLA have either vanished from public view or been dismissed. These include high-ranking members of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—China’s top military body—which oversees the armed forces. The scale and speed of the purges is unprecedented. Half of the CMC’s six uniformed members have been removed in less than two years.

Key Figures Purged

The most prominent of the recent dismissals include:

• Li Shangfu, former Defense Minister, who was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in June 2024.
• Miao Hua, head of the Political Work Department, accused of “serious violations of discipline.”
• He Weidong, the second-ranked vice chair of the CMC, whose public disappearance in March 2025 has sparked speculation of a quiet purge.

All three were previously handpicked by Xi and believed to be personally loyal. Miao and He were even associated with a so-called “Fujian faction,” officers who served in the same province as Xi during his rise through the ranks. Their abrupt removal raises the possibility that either their loyalty wasn’t as firm as assumed or their competence fell short of Xi’s expectations.

Why the Purges Are Happening

The reasons behind the dismissals remain murky. Publicly, most are labeled as cases of corruption or “disciplinary violations,” a common CCP euphemism that reveals little. However, Foreign Affairs outlines several likely causes:

1. Corruption and Graft: With China doubling its defense budget since 2012, opportunities for personal enrichment have increased dramatically. Li Shangfu previously oversaw weapons procurement, and his tenure coincided with the rapid expansion of China’s Rocket Force. The Financial Times reported that during inspections, some ballistic missiles were found filled with water instead of fuel.
2. Promotion Scandals: Officers like Miao Hua may have been involved in trading promotions for loyalty or bribes. This undermines merit-based advancement and jeopardizes competence at senior levels.
3. Power Building: Generals suspected of building personal factions or “mountaintops” within the PLA pose a threat to Xi’s centralized control. Those perceived as creating independent power bases have been removed, including those who might have rivaled Vice Chair Zhang Youxia, a longtime ally of Xi.
4. Sheer Incompetence: In some cases, Xi may simply have lost confidence in their leadership. As Fravel notes, the PLA’s professional autonomy makes it difficult for party leadership to monitor performance or ensure strategic alignment.

What This Means for China’s War Readiness

The timing of these upheavals is crucial. Xi has declared that the PLA should be ready to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan by 2027. While that date is not necessarily a deadline for war, it is a benchmark for modernization. The disruptions, however, could slow weapons development, delay decision-making, erode morale, and discourage initiative across the ranks.

The PLA relies on joint operations—the coordinated use of army, navy, air, and rocket forces—to execute any major mission, especially one involving an amphibious assault on Taiwan. These operations require a unified command structure and trust across branches. The sudden absence of key decision-makers undermines those efforts.

Moreover, risk aversion is likely to grow. Officers fearful of becoming the next target of a purge may avoid bold initiatives. Political study sessions and ideological training may increasingly take priority over combat readiness, according to Fravel.

Historical Lessons: Political Will Over Military Readiness

Despite these challenges, history suggests that lack of readiness may not prevent China from initiating military conflict. Foreign Affairs highlights three key examples where political calculations overrode military preparedness:

• Korean War (1950): China intervened despite its war-torn economy and exhausted military, suffering over 500,000 casualties to push back the U.S. presence near its border.
• India Border War (1962): Just after Mao’s Great Leap Forward, China launched a successful surprise attack against India, even as the PLA was reeling from internal purges.
• Vietnam Invasion (1979): Deng Xiaoping attacked Vietnam to counter Soviet influence, despite calling the PLA “bloated” and “lazy.” The short war resulted in over 31,000 Chinese casualties and limited political gains.

These examples show that Chinese leaders have often acted when they felt strategic necessity—not opportunity—demanded it.

If Xi sees war over Taiwan as a conflict of necessity, internal instability may not stop him. However, if he views it as optional or dependent on PLA readiness, the current chaos may force a delay.

Fravel concludes that the purges reveal more about China’s internal insecurities than its appetite for war. “Although Xi has a number of reasons to avoid taking major military action against Taiwan, he may also be concerned about how well the PLA would perform so soon after the purges.” That concern, combined with delays in weapons development and breakdowns in command structure, may lead Xi to pause—at least for now.

The question is not whether China wants to fight. It’s whether the PLA is in any shape to win. And according to Foreign Affairs, that answer today is far from certain.

ACZ Editor: We believe Xi would like to be more aggressive but he knows that any military action beyond a minor skirmish would show the world just how ready or not ready he is. If the world thinks China’s military is strong, then Xi can bluff and bluster much better. That believe and the strength of China’s economy are formidable tools of power.