China’s ambition to take Taiwan by force is no longer just a distant concern. Under President Xi Jinping, the People’s Liberation Army has been ordered to be ready to seize Taiwan militarily by 2027. That deadline has shaped the pace of China’s military modernization. Analysts Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Dr. Jack Watling, writing for the Royal United Services Institute in London, warn that Russia is now playing a decisive role in preparing China for such an operation. Their study draws on nearly 800 leaked documents, including contracts, training instructions, and equipment lists. The materials were obtained by the hacktivist group Black Moon and appear to show how Moscow has agreed to arm and train Chinese airborne forces.

“The Chinese school of airborne landing is very young,” Danylyuk explained, noting that China lacks the decades of combat experience that Russia’s paratroopers have. He argued that Moscow’s support “could help speed up China’s airborne program by about 10 to 15 years.” That acceleration could have a direct impact on when Beijing feels capable of moving against Taiwan.

China’s Challenge in Seizing Taiwan

Taiwan is heavily defended and geography works against an invader. Amphibious landings are difficult because only a handful of Taiwan’s beaches can sustain heavy craft. Runways and ports would be invaluable for bringing in reinforcements, but Taiwan’s military is likely to destroy or block them in the first hours of a conflict.

The RUSI report stresses that China is experimenting with new ways to overcome these barriers. Airdropping armored vehicles and special forces onto open grounds such as golf courses or flat fields near ports and airports could give the People’s Liberation Army a sudden combat presence in areas critical to Taiwan’s defenses. These small footholds could then be expanded into corridors for larger amphibious landings.

Wen-Ti Sung, an analyst with the Atlantic Council, suggested that parachute operations would support the larger invasion but would not replace it. “Parachuting in forces would probably support the logistics of any invasion but would be unlikely to be the main event,” he said.

What Russia is Providing

The leaked contracts outline a substantial transfer of both equipment and knowledge. Russia agreed to supply an entire battalion set of airborne vehicles, including thirty-seven BMD-4M light amphibious assault vehicles armed with 100 millimeter and 30 millimeter cannons, eleven Sprut-SDM1 anti-tank self-propelled guns with 125 millimeter cannons, and eleven BTR-MDM personnel carriers. Command and observation vehicles, along with Orlan-10 drones, are also included.

The value of the deal exceeds two hundred million dollars, according to the documents. Training is a major part of the arrangement. Russian instructors are scheduled to train Chinese paratroopers first at Russian facilities such as Kurganmashzavod and NPP Rubin, and then in collective exercises inside China. These instructors will teach not just how to operate the vehicles, but also how to coordinate command and control of airborne forces.

The contracts also cover specialized parachute technology. The “Dalnolyot” system allows for heavy loads of nearly two hundred kilograms to be dropped from altitudes up to thirty-two thousand feet and to glide between thirty and eighty kilometers before landing. According to the analysis, this could allow Chinese special forces to enter Taiwan or neighboring islands “without being noticed.” Danylyuk suggested the parachutes might be used for a “stage zero” operation, inserting forces secretly before the main invasion.

Chinese officials have not admitted to the deal, but Beijing’s statements on Taiwan remain firm. At a recent international security forum in Beijing, China’s Defense Minister Dong Jun declared that “the restoration of Taiwan to China is an integral part of the post-war international order.” He warned that China would “never allow any separatist attempts for Taiwan independence to succeed” and insisted the military was ready to defeat “any external military interference.”

Dong also positioned China as a force for peace. “The Chinese military stands ready to work with all parties to serve as a force for global peace, stability and progress,” he said. Although framed as cooperative, the message was clear: Beijing views control over Taiwan as non-negotiable and will oppose any effort by the United States or others to block it.

Moscow’s Motives

For Moscow, the deal offers several benefits. It injects much-needed funds into Russian defense industries at a time when the war in Ukraine continues to drain resources. It also positions Russia as a key partner for China’s military rise. Analysts believe Moscow may even want to pull Washington’s attention toward Asia. As Danylyuk put it, Russia could be trying to “draw Beijing into a conflict with Washington over Taiwan, distracting the U.S. from Russia’s war with Ukraine.”

This represents a shift. Historically, Russia was hesitant to export its most advanced technology to China for fear of intellectual property theft. But the global order is now dividing into camps. Moscow sees itself benefiting from China’s confrontation with the United States, and Beijing is willing to pay to shorten its timeline to military readiness.

The West views these developments with concern. High-ranking U.S. officials have already said that Xi has ordered his military to be ready for a potential invasion of Taiwan by 2027. The addition of Russian training and equipment makes that deadline more realistic.

Western analysts point out that Russia’s own airborne forces failed in Ukraine. In 2022, Russian paratroopers tried to seize Hostomel airfield near Kyiv. The plan was to establish an air bridge for reinforcements, but Ukrainian defenders shot down helicopters and destroyed the plan before it could succeed. That failure turned a hoped-for quick victory into a long and bloody war.

Yet the fact that Russia failed does not make its lessons worthless. As Danylyuk and Watling wrote, “The greatest value of the deal to China is likely in the training and procedures for command and control of parachute forces, because Russia has combat experience, whereas China doesn’t.”

Song Zhongping, a military commentator in Beijing, agreed with that assessment. He said that China may have more advanced equipment, but “Russia has more combat experience.”

The Outlook: When and How

The likeliest window for an invasion remains the late 2020s, with 2027 as a symbolic target. If Beijing acts, it would combine cyberattacks, missile barrages, suppression of Taiwan’s air defenses, and then the insertion of airborne units to seize key terrain. The ability to airdrop armored vehicles near ports and airfields could allow Chinese forces to create beachheads and corridors for follow-on troops.

The conflict would not be contained to Taiwan itself. Fighting could spill across the South China Sea as China seeks to deny the United States and its allies any chance of intervening. This would create a regional crisis unlike anything seen in decades.

The RUSI analysts caution that the invasion is not inevitable, but the trajectory of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is clear. Access to Russian airborne expertise and equipment ensures that if Beijing decides to move, it will be better prepared. As one Western expert observed, China “is playing the long game” and will almost certainly reverse engineer what Russia provides to use it not only for an invasion of Taiwan, but for intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities that reach far beyond the Taiwan Strait.