A Congressional Warning About Beijing’s Role in Nuclear and Missile Programs

On May 19, 2026, the Congressional Research Service released an updated report to Congress titled China: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation. Written by nonproliferation specialist Paul K. Kerr for members of Congress and congressional committees, the report serves as a warning about a long-running concern in Washington: China’s role in helping countries tied to nuclear weapons and missile development obtain sensitive technology, materials, and financial support.

The report was prepared by the Congressional Research Service, or CRS, a nonpartisan body that acts as shared staff for Congress and provides lawmakers with research and analysis on major policy issues. In this case, the concern is not merely historical. U.S. officials continue to worry that Chinese firms, individuals, and networks operating inside China are supplying materials, technologies, financing, and procurement support to countries linked to weapons of mass destruction programs, particularly Iran and North Korea.

While the report notes that the Chinese government has formally stepped back from directly transferring nuclear and missile technologies, U.S. officials argue that Beijing has tolerated or failed to stop activity by China-based entities that continue supporting dangerous weapons programs around the world. The report paints a picture of a government careful not to be caught openly violating international rules, while entities inside China continue to provide support to bad actors through indirect channels.

China’s History of Nuclear Proliferation

According to the report, concerns about China’s role in proliferation stretch back decades. During the 1960s and 1970s, China did not oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to new states. A declassified 1998 State Department report to Congress explained that Beijing’s position during this period was far less restrictive than today’s international norms.

A 1983 National Intelligence Estimate cited in the report found that China had been exporting nuclear materials since at least 1981 without international safeguards from the International Atomic Energy Agency. According to the intelligence assessment, Beijing’s motivations were practical and financial. Chinese leaders realized after 1979 that their modernization ambitions required money they did not have.

The report quotes the intelligence estimate as saying China began selling sensitive materials “mainly to earn hard currency.” Chinese officials reportedly concluded that they had “insufficient resources for their initially grandiose modernization program” and therefore needed revenue through expanded foreign trade. The State Council reportedly directed ministries in late 1979 to begin selling surpluses abroad.

That shift ended what had been described as China’s “abstention from commercial trade in conventional arms and nuclear materials.” During the 1980s and 1990s, China transferred nuclear and missile technology to countries whose weapons ambitions troubled Washington. Beijing assisted Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, cooperated with Iran on nuclear matters, and exported missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

Over time, China publicly changed course. Beijing joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992 as an officially recognized nuclear weapons state and pledged reforms to improve export controls. President Bill Clinton told Congress in 1998 that China had made “substantial strides” toward joining the international nonproliferation system and implementing stronger export rules. China also joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and pledged adherence to missile technology export guidelines.

Yet the report suggests the problem never truly disappeared.

China’s Modern Role: One Step Removed

The most troubling theme running through the report is that proliferation activity appears to have evolved rather than stopped.

Official U.S. reports say Beijing no longer directly transfers complete missile systems or openly supports nuclear proliferation. Instead, Chinese firms, individuals, and entities continue to supply goods, technologies, and services that could support weapons of mass destruction programs. These activities often operate through commercial channels, procurement networks, and financing systems that make government involvement harder to prove.

A 2019 State Department compliance report said “Chinese entities” continued supplying missile technology control regime restricted items to missile programs in Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan. By 2023, U.S. officials reported that Washington had repeatedly raised concerns with Beijing about missile related transfers, but “most of these cases remain unresolved” despite American requests for investigations and enforcement.

The report says that Chinese “firms and individuals” worked in 2023 and 2024 to supply technology and equipment “that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems.” Countries identified as beneficiaries included North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. In an April 2026 State Department assessment, officials stated that “entities in China” are Iran’s primary source for “a range of equipment, goods, and technology” used in Tehran’s ballistic missile program.

The Money Trail and Illicit Financing

The report also highlights another major concern: financing.

Weapons programs do not survive on machinery alone. They require money, procurement networks, money laundering systems, and access to foreign suppliers. U.S. officials argue that entities operating in China help provide those services.

A Treasury Department report from 2018 stated that “Chinese entities and individuals” engaged in proliferation financing for the benefit of Iranian and North Korean weapons of mass destruction programs. Treasury officials also cited Chinese based procurement networks helping North Korea obtain restricted components needed for missile and weapons development.

In other words, according to U.S. officials, China’s role is not limited to shipping hardware. Chinese actors are accused of helping keep dangerous weapons ecosystems alive through financial support, procurement assistance, and illicit commercial activity.

Cases That Triggered U.S. Sanctions

The report lists numerous recent sanctions against China-based firms and individuals accused of supporting missile and nuclear related programs.

In May 2025, Treasury sanctioned four Chinese individuals and six China-based entities for helping Iran source materials necessary for ballistic missile manufacturing. In April 2025, five China-based entities were sanctioned for helping procure missile propellant ingredients for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Earlier in 2025, the Commerce Department added a China-based company to the Entity List for contributions to Pakistan’s “unsafeguarded nuclear activities.”

Sanctions also targeted China-linked support for Pakistan’s missile development in 2024 and 2023, including companies accused of supplying “missile-applicable items” and equipment used to test large rocket motors. Treasury further sanctioned Chinese entities accused of procuring materials for Iran’s missile program and networks supporting North Korea’s ballistic missile and space systems.

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen offered a blunt assessment in 2017. Even if such transfers are not directly sponsored by Beijing, he argued, “China hasn’t devoted the priority, effort, or resources to thwart” them. After two decades of repeated problems, he added, “over time it becomes a choice.”

A Pattern Congress Cannot Ignore

The report ultimately presents Congress with a difficult conclusion. China publicly supports arms control, speaks favorably about nonproliferation, and participates in international agreements. Chinese officials routinely call for stronger multilateral arms control and cooperation. Yet U.S. reports continue to document China-based actors supplying materials, financing, procurement assistance, and technology tied to missile and weapons programs in countries hostile to American interests.

To critics, the pattern looks deliberate. Beijing may no longer openly hand over missile systems or nuclear components, but according to repeated U.S. government findings, China remains home to networks that quietly help fuel some of the world’s most dangerous weapons programs while maintaining enough distance to deny responsibility. Congress commissioned reports like this because the stakes are obvious: if adversarial states continue expanding missile and weapons capabilities with help flowing through China, the threat eventually reaches far beyond the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula. It becomes a global security problem.