In what appears to be a modern form of “defection,” an increasing number of U.S. college professors and researchers are leaving American institutions and relocating to China, often after facing investigation or pressure over secret affiliations with Chinese universities. The most recent example is the stunning appointment of Dr. Charles Lieber, the former chair of Harvard’s chemistry department, who has taken a new position at China’s Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School. Lieber’s case highlights a growing trend that blurs the lines between academic collaboration and covert intelligence-gathering, raising new national security concerns about how China is using its universities as platforms for espionage.

Charles Lieber: From Harvard to Tsinghua

Charles Lieber was convicted in December 2021 on six felony counts for failing to disclose millions of dollars in research funding from Chinese institutions while leading a U.S. government-funded laboratory. He had signed a lucrative contract with the Wuhan University of Technology as part of China’s Thousand Talents Plan (TTP), a program widely believed to be a mechanism for siphoning off Western innovation and intellectual property. Though Lieber faced up to 26 years in prison and over a million dollars in fines, he ultimately served no prison time and quietly retired from Harvard in February 2023.

On April 28, 2025, Lieber resurfaced in China, this time as a chair professor at Tsinghua University’s prestigious Shenzhen campus. The appointment was praised by university officials, who said his presence would “advance materials science and biomedical engineering” and help grow China into a “world-class scholarly community.”

The symbolism is hard to miss. A man convicted of hiding his Chinese ties while working on U.S.-funded nanotechnology research is now being celebrated and honored in China, a country the U.S. has long accused of running widespread academic espionage operations. As Temple University physicist Xiaoxing Xi put it, “Lieber is one of the brightest minds in nanotechnology, and now he cannot work in the United States. He finds this position in China, and it’s great for China.”

A Pattern of Defection

Lieber is not alone. Over the past 5 to 8 years, multiple professors have either resigned or been dismissed from U.S. universities due to undisclosed connections to Chinese talent programs. In many cases, these individuals have resurfaced in China, continuing their work and sometimes thriving under the Chinese system.

Below is a chart of some of the most notable cases:

This chart illustrates a clear pattern: U.S.-based professors, most with active federal research grants, quietly took second positions in China through the Thousand Talents Plan or similar efforts. When caught, some fled. Others, like Lieber, faced trial and then departed for China, where they received prestigious roles and generous support.

The Thousand Talents Plan: A Spy Program in Disguise

The Thousand Talents Plan, launched in 2008, was marketed as an initiative to attract top international researchers to help build China’s scientific capabilities. But in reality, it functioned as a coordinated effort to infiltrate foreign institutions and extract valuable knowledge and intellectual property.

The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations found that TTP recruits were often instructed to keep their contracts secret, continue working in the U.S. to maintain access to federal grants, and in some cases, transfer proprietary research to China. Chinese government documents encouraged participants to take advantage of “open research environments” in the U.S. and avoid detection by not disclosing foreign income or affiliations.

Federal agencies, particularly the FBI and NIH, began to see TTP for what it was: a state-run espionage campaign wearing the mask of academic exchange. Between 2018 and 2021, nearly 200 researchers in the U.S. were investigated for hidden affiliations, and multiple prosecutions were launched under the now-defunct “China Initiative.”

Modern-Day Defectors

Unlike Cold War-era scientists who defected for ideological reasons, modern academic defections are more often rooted in career damage, legal exposure, or simple financial incentives. Still, the net effect is the same: highly trained experts, often funded by U.S. taxpayers, end up strengthening a rival power.

During the Cold War, one of the most famous defections was that of Qian Xuesen, a Caltech rocket scientist who was deported during the McCarthy era. Qian returned to China and became the father of its missile and space programs. U.S. officials later called his expulsion “one of the stupidest decisions we ever made.”

The comparison to Lieber is hard to ignore. Just like Qian, Lieber was pushed out by suspicion, legal troubles, and political pressure. Now, he’s boosting China’s scientific and technological might, all while American institutions are left grappling with how to secure their own research ecosystem.

Academic Institutions Under Siege

The true danger may lie not just in defections but in the silent penetration of U.S. institutions. Many Chinese researchers working at American universities and laboratories are part of state-backed programs. Some are directed, knowingly or unknowingly, by China’s military or intelligence services.

Multiple investigations have uncovered researchers who were simultaneously employed by both U.S. and Chinese institutions, using one position to support the other. Some have been caught transferring proprietary software, genetic data, or even advanced chip designs to China. These aren’t one-off incidents. They are part of a systemic effort to use academia as a channel for espionage.

What makes this even more concerning is the nature of modern research. Unlike military bases or defense contractors, universities are open by design. Collaboration and transparency are core values. But these same values have made universities vulnerable. China understands this and has weaponized academic openness as a means of infiltration.

The Chilling Effect and Policy Response

As investigations grew and public scrutiny intensified, many Chinese-American scientists felt targeted, regardless of guilt. Disclosure requirements became stricter, and any mistake could lead to suspension, termination, or prosecution. Scientists like Xiaoxing Xi, who was falsely accused in 2015, say the current climate is debilitating.

“There are all these disclosure rules, and anywhere if you make the mistake you could be in huge trouble,” Xi told Chemistry World. “That’s very debilitating for me in doing my research.”

Federal agencies have tightened their oversight of grant applications, visa restrictions have increased for Chinese nationals in sensitive fields, and some U.S. universities have banned their faculty from participating in foreign talent recruitment programs.

But despite these actions, the fundamental vulnerability remains: China continues to recruit, reward, and celebrate those who deliver valuable expertise, and U.S. academia continues to bleed talent.

A Strategic Loss

In many ways, Charles Lieber’s appointment in China is a victory parade. He accomplished what the Chinese government asked: he helped transfer expertise, he kept his dual affiliations hidden long enough to avoid immediate detection, and even after being caught, he avoided serious punishment. Now, he is rewarded with a top position and a well-funded lab.

This sends a powerful message to others. China will welcome and reward those who help its rise, even if they are convicted abroad. And if the U.S. continues to treat its top scientific minds with suspicion rather than support, more may follow Lieber’s path.

At the same time, the U.S. must grapple with the reality that universities are now battlegrounds in the contest for global power. Espionage today isn’t just about spies in trench coats; it’s about research papers, patent filings, and lab discoveries quietly flowing east.

The story of Charles Lieber is not just about one man. It’s about a dangerous trend in which top American researchers, caught between the ambition of China and the suspicion of the United States, are choosing to leave. Whether driven by ideology, opportunity, or self-preservation, their departures strengthen a rival nation and weaken the country that trained them.

ACZ Editor: It is high time that this is recognized for what it is: espionage. These people are as low as Philby and McLean, as traitorous as Ames and Hanson, dirtbags to the first degree.