Victor Davis Hanson says the United States is now in a second cold war, one very different from the 45 year struggle against the Soviet Union. In his view, the first cold war was dangerous but clear. The second is quieter, deeper, and potentially more threatening.

“I’d like to talk about our two cold wars,” Hanson writes, “the one that we won against Russia and the one that we’re de facto in against China.” He argues that despite Russia’s 7,000 nuclear weapons, that fight was easier to win than the one unfolding today with China.

His warning centers on infiltration. During the Soviet era, the enemy was obvious. Russia was isolated from the free world. There were almost no Russian students in American universities. There were very few Russian nationals living in the United States. There was little business investment flowing back and forth. Espionage existed, but there was no large social or economic integration.

China, he argues, is different in nearly every way.

Why Russia Was Easier to Confront

Hanson recalls a time when Americans knew exactly who their enemy was. Soviet nuclear drills were part of childhood. Russia was seen as a pariah state. There were guardrails in Europe and Asia. There was no massive exchange of students, no deep financial entanglement.

He points out that even business ties were rare. Armand Hammer, the Occidental Petroleum executive who dealt with the Soviet Union, was controversial and widely criticized. There was no broad American investor class embedded in Russia.

In contrast, Hanson notes that China has become deeply woven into American life. He estimates there are about 300,000 Chinese students in the United States, with some policymakers discussing increasing that number. He suggests that if even 1 percent engaged in espionage, that would mean thousands of individuals gathering information from American labs and research institutions.

He also highlights that millions of Chinese nationals reside in the United States, many of whom are not citizens. During the Cold War, such a demographic presence from the Soviet Union would have been unthinkable.

Hanson argues that financial entanglement adds another layer. American companies have invested heavily in China for decades. This economic relationship, he suggests, creates hesitation in labeling China as an existential enemy.

Examples of Infiltration Beyond Opinion

Concerns about Chinese infiltration are not limited to Hanson’s commentary.

One major example was the hacking of the Office of Personnel Management. Chinese actors gained access to the security clearance files of more than 20 million Americans. The sensitive data of government officials was exfiltrated, creating long term intelligence risks.

There are also concerns about Chinese technology companies operating inside the United States. In 2021, the FBI raided the U.S. offices of PAX Technology after reports of unexplained network activity. A Treasury investigation later confirmed encrypted data was being sent to unknown third parties.

Chinese entities have secured stakes in cloud infrastructure platforms and supply chains, raising questions about access to sensitive enterprise and government data.

These cases show how infiltration can happen through commercial channels, not just spies in trench coats.

A Cyber Army of 300,000

Perhaps the most alarming development is the scale of China’s cyber force.

Researchers estimate that more than 300,000 individuals have participated in state linked hacking competitions and programs over the past decade. These competitions, such as the Zhujian Cup, are often overseen by institutions connected to the People’s Liberation Army.

Elite cyber units like PLA Unit 61398 and Unit 61486 have been tied to intellectual property theft and infrastructure sabotage. Groups known as Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon have reportedly infiltrated U.S. water utilities, oil facilities, and telecommunications networks.

Anne Neuberger, a deputy national security adviser for cybersecurity, warned that hackers “were very careful about their techniques.” In some cases, logs were erased, meaning the full scope of breaches may never be known.

Senator Dan Sullivan told Congress, “It’s shocking how exposed we are, and still are.”

George Barnes, former deputy director of the NSA, offered a chilling assessment. “After Taiwan itself, the U.S. would be target zero for disruptive cyberattacks in the event of a conflict over the island.”

Unlike the Soviet Union, which operated largely outside Western commercial systems, China’s hackers operate within a globally integrated digital economy.

Military Age Males Crossing the Border

Another layer of concern involves migration patterns.

In fiscal year 2023, more than 24,000 Chinese nationals were detained at the southern U.S. border, a sharp increase from prior years. Many are seeking asylum and fleeing economic or political pressures.

However, some analysts warn about the possibility of military age males entering the country in significant numbers. Gordon Chang has raised concerns that among legitimate asylum seekers there could be individuals with more strategic intentions.

The fear is that in the event of a crisis over Taiwan, thousands of sleeper agents could create disruptions inside the United States, ranging from sabotage to coordinated unrest.

While these scenarios remain speculative, the sheer scale of migration has added to public anxiety about national security.

The Dangers

Hanson argues that China’s strength lies in its subtlety. The Soviet Union was loud and confrontational. China, by contrast, has embedded itself in universities, corporations, technology supply chains, and even cultural debates.

He notes that criticism of China has at times been deflected with accusations of racism. During debates over COVID origins, those raising questions about the Wuhan lab were often labeled prejudiced. Hanson believes this dynamic allowed China to avoid scrutiny in ways the Soviet Union never could.

China also has scale. With 1.4 billion people compared to the Soviet Union’s peak of about 240 million, it possesses greater manpower and economic leverage.

In Hanson’s view, the United States struggles to define China as an existential threat because of empathy, economic ties, and social integration. That makes confrontation more complicated.

Policy responses are already underway. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States can block transactions involving sensitive technology. Export control laws are being strengthened. Agencies are expanding supply chain security rules beyond the Pentagon.

Some analysts suggest creating an interagency council focused specifically on high risk threats from Chinese entities. Others call for deeper cooperation with NATO and Indo Pacific allies.

Market based incentives such as tax credits and procurement preferences could support domestic alternatives to Chinese technology.

Ultimately, the challenge is balancing openness with security.

Hanson’s warning is clear. The United States once faced an enemy it could see. Today, it faces one that is deeply embedded in its economy, universities, and digital infrastructure.

Russia threatened with nuclear weapons. China, critics argue, threatens through data, supply chains, cyber warfare, and demographic presence.

If the first cold war was defined by missile silos and nuclear drills, the second may be defined by hacked databases, compromised infrastructure, and silent infiltration.

The question is not only whether China is harder to beat than Russia. It is whether the United States recognizes the battlefield it is already on.