As China marks 75 years of Communist Party rule, one question looms over its leadership: Can Xi Jinping help China avoid the fate of the Soviet Union? According to reports, Xi is deeply concerned about the possibility of a Soviet-style collapse, and this fear profoundly shapes his policies and approach to governance. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—a sudden disintegration that shocked the world—serves as a grim warning that haunts Xi’s leadership. This article delves into what China has learned from the Soviet collapse, what it hasn’t learned, and why a similar fate for China is both possible and, in some ways, unlikely.

Lessons Learned: Tightening Control to Prevent Collapse

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union left a lasting impression on China’s leadership, and the lessons learned from that moment have been central to Xi Jinping’s approach. The CCP has long studied the causes of the Soviet Union’s demise, with Xi referring to it in speeches, party meetings, and even documentaries. He has taken to heart the need for “vigilance to prevent the decay” that led to the Soviet collapse, as he warned in 2022: “We must always stay alert and determined to tackle the special challenges that a large party like ours faces” to remain the “long-term governing party.”

One of the core lessons that Xi and the CCP have drawn from the Soviet collapse is the importance of maintaining tight ideological and organizational discipline within the party. In Xi’s eyes, the Soviet Union began its downfall in 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev gave his “secret speech” denouncing Stalin’s cult of personality. This act, Xi believes, was a critical mistake that weakened the party’s ideological unity and paved the way for the eventual collapse. In a classified speech to the CCP’s Central Committee in 2023, Xi warned, “A fortress is most easily breached from within. The only ones who can defeat us are ourselves.” This fear of internal weakness has led Xi to elevate party loyalty above all else. Since taking power, he has purged millions of officials, from high-ranking leaders he dubbed “tigers” to minor bureaucrats, or “flies.” These purges, aimed at eliminating corruption and enforcing loyalty, have created an atmosphere of fear and obedience.

Xi also understands that economic failure was a major factor in the Soviet collapse. Unlike the Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy, China embraced “capitalism with Chinese characteristics,” which allowed the country to grow at a rapid pace by integrating market reforms while keeping strategic industries under state control. This approach has lifted millions out of poverty and made China a global manufacturing hub. However, Xi’s recent pivot toward a state-driven economic model, prioritizing political control over growth, mirrors some of the Soviet missteps in its later years. By tightening control over private enterprises, increasing regulation, and promoting state-owned enterprises, Xi risks stifling the innovation and growth that have underpinned China’s rise.

Another lesson Xi seems to have absorbed from the Soviet collapse is the danger of opening up too much to the West. In the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of “glasnost” and “perestroika”—openness and restructuring—backfired, eroding public trust in the government and hastening the Soviet collapse. Xi has taken a different path. He has doubled down on controlling the flow of information, building the “Great Firewall” to block foreign influence and using propaganda to shape public perception. This iron grip over information is designed to prevent ideological “contamination” and preserve the CCP’s narrative. In Xi’s own words, “Historical nihilism”—the questioning of the party’s history—was a key reason for the Soviet collapse, and he is determined to stamp out any attempts to undermine the party’s legitimacy.

Lessons Ignored: A Dangerous Lack of Flexibility

While Xi has learned certain lessons from the Soviet collapse, he has also repeated some critical mistakes. The Soviet Union’s demise was partly due to political rigidity and the lack of leadership renewal. Xi, in consolidating power around himself, seems to be making the same error. He has abolished term limits and positioned himself as “president for life,” creating a situation eerily similar to the Soviet era’s overcentralized leadership, where power was concentrated in the hands of a few elderly leaders who resisted reform. Xi’s refusal to groom a successor or establish a clear mechanism for leadership transition is a dangerous gamble that risks political instability in the future. This lack of succession planning could lead to a power vacuum or factional struggles, reminiscent of the disarray that plagued the Soviet Union in its final years.

Xi has also ignored the importance of flexibility and adaptability in political systems. Unlike China’s approach in the early 2000s—when the party allowed some degree of debate, local elections, and pluralism—Xi has stifled dissent and doubled down on authoritarian control. This move towards total political control is risky. In the late Soviet years, rigid governance, coupled with a lack of responsiveness to the people’s needs, led to widespread disillusionment. Xi’s approach of suppressing dissent and doubling down on control may seem effective in the short term, but it risks creating a brittle system incapable of dealing with internal crises.

Moreover, Xi’s obsession with controlling the narrative of China’s past has led to a crackdown on historians, intellectuals, and anyone who dares to offer an alternative view. This war on “historical nihilism” is intended to ensure that only the CCP’s version of history is taught and accepted. However, by silencing debate, Xi risks creating a gap between the government’s narrative and the people’s lived experience. This disconnect, which was also present in the Soviet Union, could eventually lead to a loss of public trust. The Soviet people became increasingly aware of the disparity between official propaganda and reality, and this erosion of trust played a major role in the disintegration of the Soviet system.

Why a Soviet-Style Collapse Is Possible

There are several factors that could lead China down the same path as the Soviet Union. One significant vulnerability is China’s economy, which is now showing signs of stagnation. High youth unemployment, a faltering property market, and declining growth all threaten the CCP’s legitimacy. The “China Dream” of prosperity is starting to feel out of reach for many, especially the younger generations, who are increasingly adopting attitudes like “lying flat”—a rejection of striving for material success—and “letting it rot”—accepting a bleak future. This disillusionment with the economic future mirrors the Soviet Union’s decline in the 1980s, when the gap between people’s aspirations and reality widened, leading to widespread frustration.

China’s current economic slowdown threatens the social contract between the CCP and the Chinese people. For decades, the party promised economic growth and prosperity in exchange for political obedience. But as growth slows, the CCP is struggling to deliver on this promise. In a country where economic success has been the primary justification for one-party rule, prolonged economic troubles could undermine the party’s grip on power. Many of China’s structural economic issues, such as an aging population, mounting debt, and declining productivity, are eerily similar to the problems faced by the Soviet Union in its final years. Unless these issues are addressed, economic stagnation could erode public confidence in the CCP.

Another factor is the rigid political system that Xi has established. By centralizing power and eliminating political rivals, Xi has weakened the system’s ability to adapt to challenges. This rigidity makes China vulnerable to internal crises, just as it did for the Soviet Union. If China faces a major crisis—economic, environmental, or social—the lack of flexibility and the absence of dissenting voices within the party could make it difficult to respond effectively. The Soviet Union was unable to adapt to the changing world, and if Xi’s China remains inflexible, it could face a similar fate.

Why a Soviet-Style Collapse Is Unlikely

Despite these vulnerabilities, there are also significant reasons why China might avoid the Soviet fate. One of the most important factors is China’s integration into the global economy. Unlike the Soviet Union, which remained relatively isolated, China is deeply interconnected with global markets. It plays a crucial role in global supply chains and is a major trading partner for many countries. This economic integration provides China with a level of external support that the Soviet Union never had. As a cornerstone of the global economy, a collapse of China would have devastating effects worldwide, which gives Beijing leverage and a safety net that the Soviet leaders lacked.

China has also learned to be ruthless in maintaining control over its territories. The Soviet Union struggled to keep its diverse republics united, and nationalist movements in regions like Ukraine and the Baltic states contributed to its collapse. In contrast, China has taken a hardline stance in places like Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, using a combination of economic incentives, surveillance, and military force to maintain control. The mass incarceration of Uyghur Muslims, the crackdown on Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, and the suppression of dissent are all part of Xi’s strategy to ensure that no region breaks away from Beijing’s control. This uncompromising approach has thus far been effective in maintaining territorial integrity, a key difference from the Soviet Union’s experience.

Another major factor that differentiates China from the Soviet Union is the control over the military. In the final years of the Soviet Union, the military became increasingly disconnected from the Communist Party, contributing to its inability to maintain order. Xi, however, has made the loyalty of the military to the CCP a top priority, ensuring that the armed forces are firmly under the party’s command. By securing the loyalty of the military, Xi has reduced the likelihood of a military-backed coup or internal fragmentation, both of which played roles in the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping’s fear of a Soviet-style collapse has driven his approach to governing China, focusing on ideological purity, control over the narrative, and strict discipline within the Communist Party. He has learned from the mistakes of the Soviet Union, tightening control to prevent internal divisions and purging those who might threaten party unity. However, his rigid approach carries its own risks. By centralizing power, eliminating rivals, and stifling debate, Xi may be sowing the seeds of future instability. The lack of political flexibility and the growing disillusionment among China’s youth pose real threats to the CCP’s long-term stability.

Nonetheless, the differences between China and the Soviet Union are significant. China’s deep integration into the global economy, its ruthless control over its periphery, and its ability to keep the military aligned with the CCP make a sudden collapse less likely. Yet, the specter of the Soviet Union continues to haunt Xi Jinping’s leadership. As China looks toward the centennial of Communist rule in 2049, the country’s future remains uncertain. Xi’s emphasis on party loyalty and ideological purity may consolidate his power in the short term, but it remains to be seen whether this strategy will enable China to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union in the long run. The next few decades will be a critical test of the CCP’s resilience, and the shadow of the Soviet collapse will continue to loom large over Xi’s leadership, casting a dark cloud over China’s future.