In a bold move, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te recently challenged China’s long-standing claim over Taiwan by drawing attention to Beijing’s selective focus on territorial integrity. Lai’s remarks highlight a significant historical inconsistency: if China is genuinely concerned about reclaiming all its lost territories, why does it not also seek to regain the lands it ceded to Russia in the 19th century? The answer, as Lai suggests, may lie more in geopolitical strategy and less in historical grievances.

The Treaty of Aigun: A Century-Old Grievance

To understand Lai’s argument, it’s essential to revisit the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, which marked one of China’s significant territorial losses during its “century of humiliation.” This period, spanning from 1839 to 1949, saw China repeatedly subjugated and defeated by foreign powers, including Western nations and Japan. Under the Treaty of Aigun, China was forced to cede vast swathes of territory north of the Amur River to Russia, including the area that is now Vladivostok. Despite the substantial land loss, this issue has remained largely dormant in contemporary Chinese foreign policy, overshadowed by Beijing’s aggressive claims over Taiwan.

China’s Reluctance to Challenge Russia

Despite the nationalistic sentiment among some Chinese citizens who argue that Russia should return these lost territories, the Chinese government has remained silent. This restraint can be attributed to the strategic partnership Beijing has cultivated with Moscow, especially in light of their shared opposition to the U.S.-led Western order. Following the international sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia has become increasingly dependent on Chinese exports and its demand for oil and natural gas, making it unlikely for China to jeopardize this alliance by reclaiming lost lands.

In fact, China’s actions demonstrate a tacit acceptance of the status quo. In 2023, China’s Natural Resource Ministry issued maps using Chinese names for Vladivostok and other cities in the region, yet these moves stopped short of demanding the land’s return. This contrast with China’s aggressive stance on Taiwan highlights a selective application of the “century of humiliation” narrative.

Taiwan: A Geopolitical Prize

President Lai’s comments underscore that China’s interest in Taiwan goes beyond historical claims of sovereignty. Unlike the sparsely populated lands lost to Russia, Taiwan presents a strategic and economic asset. Located along the first island chain in the Pacific, Taiwan holds significant military and geopolitical value, offering Beijing potential control over crucial maritime routes in the Taiwan Strait. Additionally, Taiwan’s democratic governance and alignment with Western powers pose a direct ideological challenge to Beijing’s authoritarian model, making it a more urgent target for China’s ambitions to reshape the global order in its favor.

Taiwan is also an economic powerhouse with a thriving technology sector, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, which is critical to global supply chains. This economic vitality contrasts sharply with the historical grievances over the barren lands lost to Russia. Thus, annexing Taiwan could boost China’s economic clout and technological advancements, further explaining Beijing’s concentrated pressure on the island rather than a scattered focus on historical land losses.

China’s selective pursuit of territorial claims reveals a calculated strategy to expand its influence where it perceives an opportunity to alter the balance of power without facing substantial risks. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under Xi Jinping, has ramped up military drills and rhetoric against Taiwan, suggesting a potential use of force to achieve what it frames as “reunification.” This calculated belligerence towards a relatively weaker Taiwan starkly contrasts with the diplomatic tact and restraint shown towards a militarily robust Russia. In short, China can bully Taiwan.

While historical narratives of territorial loss are used to justify its actions, China’s selective historical memory—aggressively pursuing Taiwan while ignoring the lands ceded to Russia—suggests its priorities are driven more by present-day strategic interests than by a genuine desire to restore historical boundaries.

President Lai Ching-te’s comments shine a light on the inconsistency in China’s narrative of territorial integrity. By pointing out China’s reluctance to challenge Russia over lands lost in the 19th century, Lai emphasizes that Beijing’s claims over Taiwan are less about historical right and more about strategic advantage and economic gain.

Will this change the narrative? Perhaps. Slightly.