For much of the late twentieth century, China’s leaders tried to ensure that no single individual could ever again dominate the Communist Party the way Mao Zedong had. After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping introduced a series of informal safeguards that encouraged collective leadership, retirement norms, succession planning, and term limits. These changes were intended to prevent another era of one-man rule and the political chaos that had accompanied Mao’s later years.

According to recent reporting by The Wall Street Journal and analysis from scholars at the Brookings Institution and other experts, Xi Jinping has spent much of his fourteen years in power dismantling many of those safeguards. While Xi has not attempted to recreate the mass violence of Stalin’s Great Terror or Mao’s Cultural Revolution, he has adopted many of their political techniques while modernizing them for the twenty first century. Instead of relying primarily on public executions, mob violence, or labor camps to enforce obedience, Xi has increasingly turned to party discipline, technology, centralized bureaucracy, and sophisticated surveillance.

The result is an authoritarian system that many analysts argue combines elements of both Mao and Stalin while taking advantage of tools neither leader could have imagined.

Personality Cult

One of the clearest similarities between Xi Jinping, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong is the cultivation of a personality cult centered on the supreme leader. Throughout history, authoritarian rulers have sought to portray themselves not simply as political leaders, but as indispensable figures whose wisdom guides the nation’s future.

During Mao’s rule, portraits, slogans, speeches, and the famous Little Red Book became nearly unavoidable parts of everyday life. Stalin similarly elevated himself into an almost mythical figure whose image dominated Soviet propaganda, while criticism of his leadership became unthinkable.

Xi has revived many of these practices in a modern form. His political philosophy, officially known as “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” has been written into both the Communist Party charter and China’s Constitution alongside “Mao Zedong Thought.” New party members are required to study Xi’s writings before admission, and existing members participate in regular study sessions devoted to his policies. State media increasingly portrays Xi as the central figure responsible for China’s national rejuvenation.

The Wall Street Journal notes that Chinese state media has revived references to Xi as the “people’s leader,” a title previously associated with Mao. Scholars argue that emphasizing Xi’s personal leadership helps justify his increasingly centralized style of government while reinforcing the message that loyalty to the Party ultimately means loyalty to Xi himself.

Unlike Mao, Xi has avoided encouraging mass revolutionary enthusiasm that could spiral beyond government control. Instead, his personality cult is carefully managed through state institutions, education, official media, and digital communication. Rather than relying on spontaneous public devotion, it is reinforced through mandatory political education and constant exposure to official messaging. In many respects, Xi has transformed the personality cult into a bureaucratic institution that serves both propaganda and political discipline.

Political Purges

Political purges have long been one of the defining tools authoritarian leaders use to eliminate opposition and consolidate power. Stalin’s Great Terror between 1936 and 1938 remains one of history’s most notorious examples. According to HISTORY.com, at least 750,000 people were executed while more than one million others were sent to Gulag labor camps. Stalin’s purge reached virtually every corner of Soviet society, targeting Communist Party officials, military officers, intellectuals, scientists, artists, and ordinary citizens. The message was unmistakable: no one was beyond suspicion.

Mao employed similar tactics through repeated political campaigns. During the Cultural Revolution, millions faced public humiliation, imprisonment, forced labor, or death as Mao mobilized youthful Red Guards against alleged counterrevolutionaries. Earlier, during the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Mao briefly encouraged criticism of the Communist Party before abruptly reversing course. Those who accepted his invitation to speak openly soon found themselves labeled “Rightists” during the Anti Rightist Campaign, with many losing their careers, freedom, or lives.

Xi has adapted this strategy without embracing the mass bloodshed that characterized his predecessors. Instead, he has relied on a sweeping anti corruption campaign that has become one of the largest political purges in modern Chinese history. According to The Wall Street Journal, party authorities disciplined nearly one million officials during 2025 alone. Senior Politburo members, military commanders, cabinet ministers, financial regulators, and executives of state owned enterprises have all fallen under investigation.

The scale of these disciplinary actions has few modern parallels in China. Unlike Stalin or Mao, Xi generally relies on dismissal, imprisonment, public confession, and political disgrace rather than widespread executions. Nevertheless, the practical effect is similar. Officials understand that even long standing allies or personally selected protégés can suddenly become targets. As historian Joseph Torigian observed, “The more successful you are, the more enemies are afraid of you and mobilize to destroy you, and therefore the more you need to purge.”

Absolute Loyalty

Authoritarian systems depend upon more than fear alone. They also require unwavering personal loyalty to the leader.

Stalin demanded absolute obedience from Communist Party officials, often using fabricated conspiracies and show trials to eliminate anyone suspected of independent thinking. Mao likewise insisted that loyalty to his revolutionary vision outweighed expertise, competence, or practical concerns. During the Cultural Revolution, disagreement with Mao could quickly become evidence of political betrayal.

Xi has institutionalized loyalty in ways that combine elements of both systems. Borrowing directly from Mao era practices, Politburo members now participate in annual criticism and self criticism sessions chaired by Xi himself. During these meetings, senior leaders evaluate one another according to standards that explicitly include loyalty to Xi’s leadership.

Xi has also greatly expanded the authority of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which now oversees the conduct of roughly one hundred million Communist Party members. Inspection teams operate throughout government ministries, provincial administrations, military organizations, and major state enterprises, examining not only corruption but also political reliability and implementation of Xi’s policies.

The campaign increasingly targets officials accused of delaying, weakening, or distorting central directives. State media has emphasized that local governments must not “discount, alter or distort” Beijing’s decisions. Loyalty therefore extends beyond avoiding corruption. Officials are expected to execute Xi’s agenda exactly as directed.

This approach differs from Mao’s often chaotic revolutionary campaigns. Xi relies on a highly structured bureaucracy governed by formal rules, inspections, and disciplinary procedures. Yet the underlying principle remains strikingly similar. Political survival depends less on independent judgment than on demonstrating complete alignment with the leader’s priorities.

Military Control

Control of the military has always been essential to maintaining authoritarian rule. Mao famously declared that “the Party commands the gun,” recognizing that political authority ultimately rests upon control of armed force. Stalin similarly purged thousands of military officers during the Great Terror after becoming convinced they posed a potential threat to his leadership.

Xi appears to have drawn heavily from both examples. Since assuming power, he has repeatedly reorganized the People’s Liberation Army while removing senior generals and military officials through anti corruption investigations. Some of China’s highest ranking officers, including members of the Central Military Commission and top military commanders, have been dismissed or investigated.

These actions serve multiple purposes. Publicly, they are presented as efforts to eliminate corruption and improve military readiness. At the same time, they reinforce Xi’s personal authority over China’s armed forces by demonstrating that rank offers no protection from disciplinary action.

Unlike Stalin’s military purges, which severely weakened the Soviet armed forces before World War II through mass executions, Xi’s campaign has largely relied on investigations, dismissals, expulsions, and imprisonment rather than widespread killings. Nevertheless, analysts argue that the repeated removal of senior commanders sends a powerful message throughout the military hierarchy that loyalty to Xi personally is every bit as important as professional competence.

By combining Mao’s insistence that the Party controls the military with modern bureaucratic enforcement mechanisms, Xi has created a system in which political reliability remains inseparable from military advancement. As China continues expanding its military capabilities, ensuring unquestioned loyalty among senior commanders appears to remain one of Xi’s highest priorities.

If this does not scare you enough, read Part 2, tomorrow which will cover Elimination of rivals, Removal of institutional limits, Fear as governance and Modern surveillance.